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A COMMUNITARIAN COMPROMISE ON SPEECH




The zenith of campus speech codes and antiharassment policies has
peaked and the backlash has arrived. Recently, some schools even have
abandoned their codes, with much attendant publicity.' Criticism of the
codes has come from many quarters. Opposition to multiculturalism or
enforced nondiscrimination has provided the basis for the more shrill and
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1. For example, the University of Michigan and Wesleyan University have repealed
their policies. Lawrence White, Hate-Speech Codes That Will Pass Constitutional Muster,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 25, 1994, at A48. The University of Pennsylvania recently
limited its policy condemning hate speech, but explained that "the content of student
speech or expression is not by itself a basis for disciplinary action." University of Penn-
sylvania, Code of Student Conduct, July 12, 1994. 1hreats of violence and disorderly con-
duct, however, are precluded by the policy. Id. Other schools, such as the University of
Texas, are reexamining or modifying their policies in reaction to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), which placed limitations on con-
tent-based restrictions of speech by the state. Telephone Interview with Gage Paine,
Associate Dean of Students, University of Texas at Austin (June 30, 1994).
For a survey of codes at public institutions, see ARATI W. KORWAR, WAR OF WORDS:
SPEECH CODES AT PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1994); Michael A. Olivas, The
Political Economy of Immigration, Intellectual Property, and Racial Harassment: Case Stud-
ies of the Implementation of Legal Change on Campus, 63 J. HIGHER EDUC. 570, 581-84
(1992).
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ideological attacks.2 These critics tend to brand the initials "P.C." on
code supporters.
3
More reasoned and moderate criticisms emphasize that many codes are
poorly drafted, vague, or overbroad.4 When vagueness is combined with
enforcement by poorly trained or overzealous administrators, it leads to
prosecutions that are disproportionate to the underlying complained-of
behavior and chills campus speech.5 Other critics oppose all speech codes
2. See James Boyle, The PC Harangue, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1462 (1993) (review-
ing DEBATING PC: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1992)). As with bilingual education and affirmative action
programs, conservatives oppose speech codes, which are based on a belief that an "Ameri-
can state should stand for no particular religion or pattern of culture, or [which are based
on] a commitment to . . . 'diversity.' " Id.
3. "P.C.," or politically correct, is often used as an epithet. Ironically, those leveling
these charges, presumably in the interest of promoting free speech, often stifle debate. See
Boyle, supra note 2, at 1465. One commentator noted that
in some of the cases described by the critics of political correctness, there seems
to be a complete failure to recognize that free speech cuts both ways. If I tell a
black student that even when she honestly believes her classmate's position to be
racist she is not allowed to say so, I am hardly supporting the cause of free speech.
The same goes for the students who find it objectionable when a professor always
casts women in the role of secretaries, men in the role of lawyers. What are we
supposed to do in the name of the First Amendment, tell the students to shut up?
Id.
4. See White, supra note 1, at A48.
5. For example, the University of New Hampshire and Professor Donald Silva re-
cently reached a settlement after Silva brought suit against the university, claiming the
school violated his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment. See Silva v.
University of New Hampshire, No. Civ. 93-533-SD, 1994 WL 504417, *17 (D.N.H. Sept. 15,
1994). The university suspended Silva without pay for sexual harassment when he used
sexual allusions in class. Id. On one occasion, Silva, a technical writing professor, ex-
plained the concept of "focus" in writing: " 'Focus is like sex. You seek a target. You zero
in on your subject. You move from side to side. You close in on the subject. You bracket
the subject and center on it. Focus connects experience and language. You and the subject
become one.' " Id. at *3. On another occasion he gave the following example of a simile
to his class: " 'Belly dancing is like jello on a plate with a vibrator under the plate.' " Id.
In addition to the classroom comments, several students complained that Silva used
double entendres or made other offensive remarks in their presence. Id. at *15-17. One
student said that, in response to her remark that she was "going to jump on the computer,"
Silva replied," 'I'd like to see that.' " Id. at *16. Another stated that he told a student who
was on her hands and knees searching through a card catalog that she looked like she'd
" 'had a lot of experience' ".on her knees. Id. at *16. A couple of other students claimed
Silva implied that they had a lesbian relationship by asking, " 'How long have you two
been together?' " Id. Another claimed he made too many sexual references when speak-
ing to her. Id. at *15-16.
The United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted Silva a
preliminary injunction holding that Silva would likely succeed on his First Amendment
claim. Id. at *21. The court ordered the university to reinstate Silva, finding that the
school disciplined Silva merely because a few students found his choice of words "outra-
geous": " '[Tihe fact that society may find speech offensive is not sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it .... '" Id. at *21 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)). In
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and attempt to regulate verbal harassment on various grounds, including
the need to uphold the marketplace of ideas and the claimed inherent
ineffectiveness of codes.6 Lately, some commentators decry many codes'
emphasis on victimization.7 Arguing that a focus on victim status de-
prives one of agency, these critics instead endorse self-reliance.8 They
believe that targets of harassment should assume the responsibility to re-
spond individually to harassers.9 Their opponents in turn reply that har-
assment policies can fortify victims' empowerment, giving them the
necessary support to fight harassment."°
Like many others, I approach the entire subject not only with a great
deal of ambivalence, but also with some trepidation. When interests as
potent as free speech and equality clash, the fallout can easily obscure the
issues, generating more heat than light, as evidenced by recent media
attention. 1 In this atmosphere, supporters of even limited regulation
reaching its decision, the Silva court only considered the evidence that "clearly demon-
strate[d] that but for Silva's classroom statements he would not have been subject to UNH
discipline." Id. at *23.
The University of New Hampshire planned to appeal the court's decision, but the recent
settlement ended the litigation. Professor Silva will receive $60,000 in back pay and com-
pensation and $170,000 in lawyer's fees. In addition, the school reinstated Silva without
prejudice and the charges against him were removed from his personnel file. In Brief-
Settlement in University of New Hampshire Sexual Harassment Case, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb.
1995, at 5. For additional discussion of the Silva case, see Richard Bernstein, Guilty if
Charged, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 13, 1994, at 11; Academic Freedom and Tenure: University
of New Hampshire, ACADEME, Nov.-Dec. 1994, 70, 80 (concluding that the sanctions im-
posed by the University of New Hampshire departed from established standards of aca-
demic due process).
6. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484, 530, 562-69 (arguing current regulations chill protected speech). Alterna-
tively, Strossen suggests, "the strategy of increasing speech-rather than decreasing it-
not only would be consistent with first amendment principles, but also would be more
effective in advancing equality goals." Id. at 562.
7. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1421-23 (1993)
(stating that women students and students of color feel silenced by the codes in the class-
room); see Kathryn Abrams, Songs of Innocence and Experience: Dominance Feminism in
the University, 103 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535-39 (1994) (referring to one critic's assessment that
the codes teach women to be " 'hothouse flowers,' " unable to handle the demands of the
sexual world).
8. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 1538.
9. See, e.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON
CAMPUS 88-93 (1993) (indicating that the response to sexual harassment should be decol-
lectivized action rather than imposition of codes of etiquette).
10. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 1552-57.
11. Sheldon Hackney, former president of the University of Pennsylvania, recently
gave his perspective on the turmoil over speech codes: " 'In this kind of argument, one is
either right or wrong, for them or against them, a winner or a loser. Real answers are the
casualties of such drive-by debate. This may be good entertainment, but it is a disservice to
the American people. It only reinforces lines of division and does not build toward agree-
ment.' Paul McMasters, Free Speech Versus Civil Discourse: Where Do We Go From
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become "censors," while opponents are not only "insensitive" but
''reactionary."
More fundamentally, even after one manages to pick through the deb-
ris, a basic tension remains. Each side's arguments have not only a modi-
cum of appeal, but some merit. 12 Encouraging the free expression of
ideas and constant debate enhances creativity and diminishes misdirected
suppression of dissidents. 3 On the other hand, giving free rein to bigots
and bullies ultimately undermines the very academic atmosphere neces-
sary to sustain creative debate. 14 Restraining group-based harassment
also can foster multiculturalism. Permitting the suppression of disap-
proved speech, however, creates almost insurmountable problems of line-
drawing and enforcement.15  Further, imposing sanctions on certain
speech can make martyrs of bigots. 6 As a result, the debate rages on,
circling endlessly around itself. Its terms are by now well-rehearsed and
even somewhat "shopworn," as one commentator recently observed. 7
Here?, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 8, 11-12 (quoting Sheldon Hackney); see also Buf-
faloed: Risking Political Incorrectness, Penn Rescinds its Speech Code, TIME, Nov. 29, 1993,
at 67, 67 (explaining that the University of Pennsylvania replaced its speech code with a
policy based on community standards); Colleges Questioning Anti-Bias Guidelines, PHIL.
INOR., May 2, 1994, at A13 (noting that college officials are concerned that federal civil
rights guidelines will cause schools to violate the First Amendment); Racism Taints Univer-
sities' Hallowed Halls, USA TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 6A (indicating that the University of
Massachusetts' efforts to deal with campus racism include the recruitment of minority
faculty and students and diversity training for staff); Stanford Anti-Harassment Policy Vio-
lates Rights of Free Speech, California Judge Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 10, 1995,
at A32 [hereinafter Stanford Anti-Harassment Policy Violates Rights] (discussing that the
Stanford antiharassment policy was struck down under a California statute applying consti-
tutional standards to private schools); War of Words over Stanford's Speech Rule: Student's
Lawsuit Claims University's Code is Unconstitutional Gag on Free Expression, S.F.
CHRON., May 4, 1994, at A14 (indicating that students are challenging the speech code by
seeking its repeal or reduction).
12. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, and Political Correctness:
Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1992) (recogniz-
ing that, while the intent of speech codes to protect the "well-being" of students is "legiti-
mate," such codes ultimately stifle the "free and robust exchange of ideas" crucial to
preserving academic freedom); Strossen, supra note 6, at 530 (arguing that "silencing cer-
tain expressions may be tantamount to silencing certain ideas").
13. See Rychlak, supra note 12, at 1429 (arguing that education "is dependent upon
the free flow of ideas so that open and honest debate can lead to the correct answer").
14. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,452-53 (arguing that racial insults "disserve" the purpose
of the First Amendment to encourage "the greatest amount of speech").
15. See McMasters, supra note 11, at 11 (discussing the failure of speech codes to
define acceptable and unacceptable speech).
16. Henry L. Gates, Jr., Truth or Consequences: Putting Limits on Limits, ACADEME,
Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 14, 15.
17. Id. at 14. Several legal commentators also have considered these topics. See
Michael A. Olivas, Racial Harassment/Hate Speech Bibliography, 63 J. HIGHER EDUC. 599,
1994] Communitarian Compromise on Speech Codes
Notwithstanding the problematic nature of codes, however, I submit
that a narrowly drafted, rationally enforced code prohibiting physical and
certain verbal acts of racial, religious, and sexual harassment still can play
an important role on campuses.18 While personal insults and unwanted
sexual advances constitute the majority of this harassment, in some in-
stances codes also might address subtle, veiled attacks that apparently are
not directed toward a particular individual.1 9 Such limited codes, when
enforced intelligently, can promote rather than stifle academic freedom
for everyone in the community consonant with First Amendment
principles.2 °
I analyze sexual, racial, and religious harassment similarly because they
are conceptually more alike than distinct. Such harassment may be mutu-
ally reinforcing in cases involving women of color, for example, who ex-
perience both racial and sexual harassment, with no clear boundary
distinguishing the two.21 Although sexual harassment often takes the
599 (1992) (listing citations of several legal articles dealing with harassment and hate
speech).
18. Campus codes might also prohibit group-based discrimination and harassment
based on sexual orientation or disability, or even prohibit all forms of personal harassment.
19. For a definition of this narrow exception to the individually directed requirement,
see infra text accompanying notes 83-94.
20. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 450-51 (describing Stanford University's speech
code prohibiting "face-to-face insults" as an example of a valid speech regulation that
meets First Amendment requirements). My argument is directed primarily toward private
institutions that need not comport with the Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2548 (1992) (striking down as unconstitutional a St. Paul, Minne-
sota ordinance that contained "selective limitations upon speech").
In Canada, the Ontario Ministry of Education and Training recently directed universities
to devise plans to achieve zero tolerance of harassment and discrimination. Wendy
Warburton, Ontario's Campus Crackdown: Is a "Code of Conduct" the Best Way to Curb
Offensive Behavior?, OT-rAWA CITIZEN, Feb. 8, 1994, at B3. The Ministry's framework
includes broad prohibitions on "speech and conduct that harasses or discriminates against
a designated group or creates a negative environment on campus." Id. Critics charge that
such prohibitions "threaten[] free speech and academic independence." Id. Such con-
cerns led the faculty and students of a particular university to circulate petitions opposing
speech and conduct codes. Id. Notably, the scope of the Ministry's framework for prohib-
iting harassment exceeds similar attempts in the United States that failed to pass muster
under the First Amendment. Id.
21. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149; see also Martha Chamallas, Feminist Construc-
tions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, I
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 117-19 (1992) (discussing courts' treatment of racial and sexual
harassment as two distinctive types of discrimination). Chamallas attributes the courts'
differential treatment of racial and sexual harassment to the "difference in the traditional
understandings of the nature and effects of the two types of discrimination." Id. at 117.
The failure of certain institutions to address other forms of harassment reinforces such
disparate treatment. The 1980 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
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form of unwanted advances,22 frequently it consists of the same type of
repellent group-based attacks as those associated with racial, ethnic, and
religious harassment. Moreover, harassing sexual advances generally are
the product of a desire for power rather than a desire for sex.2 3
Further, although policies and codes are problematic,2 4 the lack of a
policy is even more troublesome because it appears to counter harassing
incidents with passivity.25 Silence and inaction in the face of intimidating
guidelines, for example, targeted only sexual harassment. Id. In challenging this distinc-
tion, critical race theorists in the late 1980s "laid a foundation for thinking about race and
sex discrimination in ways that intersected or converged" Id. at 119.
22. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 106 (1987) (noting that
"[b]etween a quarter and a third of women in the federal workforce report having been
sexually harassed, many physically").
23. Id. at 107 (describing the power men derive from the hierarchical nature of gen-
der). Nonetheless, many schools treat racial and sexual harassment differently, according
greater protection to racist speech and behavior than to sexual harassment. Most sexual
harassment policies are based on EEOC guidelines covering workplace harassment. The
Supreme Court discussed the guidelines in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), upholding the EEOC's determination that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of
Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment." Id. at 66.
In part because schools have extended the EEOC workplace protections to the entire
academic context, and some private schools have promulgated racial and religious harass-
ment policies in light of the Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.
Ct. 2538 (1992), schools often treat analogous conduct distinctly. For example, under
Pennsylvania State University's policies, verbal or physical abuse of a sexual nature consti-
tutes sexual harassment if it "has the purpose or effect of interfering unreasonably with the
individual's work or academic performance or creates an offensive, hostile, or intimidating
working or learning environment." Pennsylvania State University, Policies & Rules: A
Guide for Students (1993-94). Thus, such verbal abuse is an offense in itself. The same
policies provide, however, that similar abuse of a racial nature is only an aggravating factor
of another, independent violation of the policy. Id.
The end result is anomalous, because racial and religious harassment are as inimical to
the academic mission as sexual harassment. Moreover, overbroad sexual harassment poli-
cies threaten academic freedom as much as similar policies concerning other group charac-
teristics. Cf. Karen Czapanskiy, Anti-Harassment: Building Law School Policies, 4 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 163, 164 (1993) (stating that nearly all of the 70% of law schools
responding to a request for copies of their antiharassment policies sent sexual harassment
policies only; very few sent materials relating to other group-based harassment, leading the
authors to conclude "that few law schools have policies addressing harassment based on
multiple identities").
24. See Strossen, supra note 6, at 530 (arguing that the "chilling effect" of codes may
promote even "broader forms of censorship").
25. Abandoning policies does not vitiate the underlying problems. Instead, abandon-
ment cedes victory to those who would deny basic human rights to others. Although critics
of speech codes often promote the use of education to remedy discrimination or harass-
ment, such mandatory sensitivity training is often more intrusive than a mere policy or
rule. See Strossen, supra note 6, at 563 (suggesting that universities might implement edu-
cational programs "designed to promote intergroup understanding"). Moreover, a code's
mere existence expresses a university's commitment to equality and may deter harassment
and discrimination as well. See Paul Reidinger, Who's the Boss?, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at
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behavior may imply condonation of misconduct.26 Theoretically, one can
counter harassing speech with more speech, but that is not a realistic ave-
nue of redress for many victims who are figuratively beaten into submis-
sion and who withdraw or freeze in panic.27
Accordingly, the balance between a code's potential to chill speech and
the unwelcome environment enhanced by lack of prohibitions should be
struck in favor of limited regulation. While academic freedom requires
that individuals be permitted to speak their consciences, it does not shield
harassment of and threats against specific individuals, 28 even when the
offensive conduct takes subtle forms. Thus, academic freedom is not un-
bounded and absolute, but rather limited by notions of responsibility to
other members of the community.
In this Article, I focus initially on the concept of academic freedom and
its relationship to harassment policies. Specifically, I provide a general
justification of narrowly drafted policies that primarily restrict harass-
ment directed to individuals. The justification is premised upon a com-
munitarian model of a university that simultaneously protects both
academic freedom and relatively powerless individuals.
This Article presents an argument that is both practical and theoretical.
Its structure is primarily dialectical. I proceed by exposition of arguments
and counterarguments and attempt to achieve a synthesis that is not an
ultimate or universal solution, but rather a pragmatic and provisional
one.2 9 The tension between the two extremes of absolute liberty and ab-
103, 103 (reviewing KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION (1993)).
Reidinger quotes Karst as stating that " '[m]uch of the promise of the law ... lies in its
perceived potential for governing the expression of public values-not just the power of
law to regulate expression, but the expressive power of law itself.'" Id.
26. See Gates, supra note 16, at 15 (explaining that, according to code proponents,
adoption of codes "expresses" a university's "opposition to hate speech and bigotry").
27. See infra text accompanying notes 69-76 (discussing injuries caused by harass-
ment); see also Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 385 (1991). Delgado explained:
Not only does racist speech, by placing all the credibility with the dominant
group, strengthen the dominant story, it also works to disempower minority
groups by crippling the effectiveness of their speech in rebuttal. This situation
makes free speech a powerful asset to the dominant group, but a much less help-
ful one to subordinate groups ....
Id. (footnote omitted).
28. For an analogous balancing approach regarding workplace sexual harassment, see
Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 43-49 (1990)
(suggesting sexist speech can be regulated consistent with the First Amendment, "so long
as the speech is made with discriminatory intent ... or [] the offended listener constitutes a
captive audience").
29. One commentator explained that the optimal method for analyzing an issue such
as this one is as follows:
1994]
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solute equality creates the impetus for an intermediate resolution of the
conflict. The potential feasibility of my proposals is their chief
justification.
I flesh out in detail an appropriate method to address targeted harass-
ment, but I do not.specify additional policy requirements. I suggest, how-
ever, alternative formulations of various issues. My choice not to endorse
a particular model policy is intentional, as institutional needs, capacities,
and standards of appropriateness differ.
Next, I examine the term "hostile environment," a lightning rod in
some of the current debates. Most schools' sexual harassment policies
include this term. Originally Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) guidelines employed this phrase; subsequently Title VII
workplace sexual and racial harassment case law also embraced the
term. 30 Hostile environment generally refers to the consequences of ra-
cist or sexist acts on the complainant that produce a pervasive sense that
the working (or educational) atmosphere is alien and that undermine the
[O]ne thing that intellectuals cannot do without is the full intellectual process
itself. Into it goes historically informed research as well as the presentation of a
coherent and carefully argued line that has taken account of alternatives. In addi-
tion, there must be, it seems to me, a theoretical presumption that in matters
having to do with human history and society any rigid theoretical ideal, any sim-
ple additive or mechanical notion of what is or is not factual, must yield to the
central factor of human work, the actual participation of peoples in the making of
human life. [T]his kind of human work, which is intellectual work, is worldly....
it is situated in the world, and about that world. It is not about things that are so
rigidly constricted and so forbiddingly arcane as to exclude all but an audience of
likeminded, already fully convinced persons.
Edward W. Said, The Politics of Knowledge, in DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 172, 176-77 (Paul Berman ed., 1992)
[hereinafter DEBATING P.C.]; see also Boyle, supra note 2, at 1481 (stating that "[w]ithout
roots in practical activity and lived experience, campus politics becomes a ritualistic invo-
cation of formal rules").
30. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying the
hostile environment language of Rogers to sexual harassment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a hostile racial environment claim under Title VII
for the first time), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). For other racial harassment cases, see
White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991); Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503 (11th
Cir. 1989). For other sexual harassment cases, see Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991) (focusing on racial as
well as sexual harassment); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. Osce-
ola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
The concept of hostile environment is making inroads into Title IX sexual harassment
jurisprudence as well. E.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying Title VII standards to Title IX claims); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of
Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (using the "abusive environment" type
of sexual harassment standard under Title IX), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
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well-being of the victim.31 The concept frequently has been imported
from sexual harassment policies into overall antiharassment policies, ap-
plying broadly not only to sexual harassment, but also to racial, religious,
national origin, disability, sexual orientation, and occasionally all other
forms of harassment.32
The specific issue addressed in this section of the Article is whether the
hostile environment concept properly belongs in an antiharassment code
or whether it defies precise definition and application. Embedded in this
inquiry is an important issue concerning the extent to which nontargeted
harassment is actionable. Some of the more problematic and disturbing
prosecutions have amplified hostile environment far beyond the con-
straints created by Title VII case law to encompass allegedly offensive
conduct that is ambiguous at best.33
Finally, I examine the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) model sexual harassment policy, which relies on the hostile en-
vironment concept, and revisions to it recently proposed by the AAUP
31. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993); Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
32. For example, Duke University's Harassment Policy Statement defines harassment
as "[t]he creation of a hostile or intimidating environment, in which verbal or physical
conduct, because of its severity and/or persistence, is likely to interfere significantly with an
individual's work or education, or affect adversely an individual's living conditions." The
policy applies the hostile environment concept broadly to all forms of harassment; it also
specifically defines sexual coercion as a form of harassment. Duke University, Harassment
Policy Statement para. II.A (effective Jan. 1, 1994), reprinted in DIALOGUE, Dec. 10, 1993,
at 7.
At the University of Connecticut, the President's Policy on Harassment provides that
"[h]arassment consists of abusive behavior directed toward an individual or group because
of race, ethnicity, ancestry, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age, physi-
cal or mental disabilities .... The University ... (b) forbids harassment that has the effect
of interfering with an individual's performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive environment." University of Connecticut, President's Policy on Harassment I
(Mar. 29, 1994).
Stanford University's Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Dis-
criminatory Harassment is intended to regulate harassment. It states that
Each student has the right to equal access to a Stanford education, without dis-
crimination on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation,
or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of students on the basis of any of these
characteristics contributes to a hostile environment that makes access to educa-
tion for those subjected to it less than equal.
Stanford University, Fundamental Standard Interpretation: Free Expression and Discrimi-
natory Harassment (1990), reprinted in Lawrence, supra note 14, at 450-51 [hereinafter
Stanford University Policy]. The Stanford policy recently was struck down under a Califor-
nia statute that applies constitutional standards to private institutions. Stanford Anti-Har-
assment Policy Violates Rights, supra note 11, at A32. The court relied heavily on R.A. V. to
hold that because the policy protects only certain groups, it is unconstitutionally viewpoint
discriminatory. Id.
33. See supra note 5; infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
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Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure. The AAUP has a long
history of expert experience with academic freedom issues, and many ac-
ademic institutions rely on or adopt its model policies and procedures
when drafting their own.
34
II. SCOPE AND DEFINITION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Sources
The term "academic freedom" has been assigned various interpreta-
tions or emphases by writers. Some employ it to justify an autonomous
view of the role of faculty within the academy," while others stress the
institution's need for independence from outside control.36 Disagree-
ment often arises concerning the nature of permissible limitations upon
this freedom and its distribution among various groups in the academic
community.37
Notwithstanding the variety of definitions and differences in emphasis,
most writers share a fundamental belief that academic freedom requires
that faculty possess the freedom to pursue and convey their own ideas of
truth,38 at least within an area of professional expertise and often ex-
tending to extramural utterances as well. Correlatively, students must be
free to learn a full range of ideas without imposition of others' orthodoxy,
34. 1 am a member of the AAUP's Committee W on the Status of Women and serve as
a consultant to its Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Committee A is pro-
posing that the AAUP revise its model sexual harassment policy to better accommodate
academic freedom concerns.
35. See Matthew W. Finkin, "A Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace": Academic
Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and Law, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1990, at 357, 366-67, 373-74 (articulating the view that academic freedom
allows faculty to research, teach, and publish on many issues without institutional infringe-
ment upon their rights of expression); see also Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 357
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (holding that teachers, not school boards, are constitutionally empow-
ered under academic freedom to select course material and assignments relating to ap-
proved topics).
36. See Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REV. 831, 848,
851-53 (1987).
37. Academic freedom has an "equivocal" meaning. Piarowski v. Illinois Community
College, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.) (holding that academic freedom argu-
ments apply to both the institution's freedom to pursue its goals without undue govern-
ment interference and to individuals' freedom to pursue personal goals without undue
interference from the academic institution), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985); see Fisher v.
Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 704 P.2d 213, 217 (Alaska 1985) (stating that
although a public school board's authority to review classroom materials is broad, it may
not design a curriculum that favors a particular religion or political stance).
38. Today, one generally does not seek Truth, but truths, or for' the postmodernist,
multiple perspectives that give insight into the socially-constructed and contingent nature
of knowledge.
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and academic institutions must support these efforts without undue
outside interference.3 9
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the concept of aca-
demic freedom on a number of occasions. The Court, however, has failed
to define its exact nature and scope and failed to develop a real constitu-
tional theory of academic freedom.4" Generally, the concept, as applied
to public universities,4 is rooted in the First Amendment's concern with
free inquiry and promotion of heterodox views that critically examine
conventional wisdom. As with related areas of First Amendment juris-
prudence, truth is said to be discovered in the marketplace of ideas,
culled from a cacophony of diverse views.43 Indeed, the Court has re-
ferred interchangeably to academic freedom and the right to political
expression.4
39. One Commentator highlighted Judge Posner's conception of academic freedom:
"[Academic freedom] is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pur-
sue its ends without interference from the government ... and the freedom of the
individual teacher (or in some versions-indeed in most cases-the student) to
pursue his ends without interference from the academy; and these two freedoms
are in conflict .... "
David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 282
(alteration in original) (quoting Piarowski, 759 F.2d at 629).
40. See Yudof, supra note 36, at 854-57 (discussing the mixed and confused state of
defining academic freedom).
41. Many private institutions voluntarily choose to comply with First Amendment
standards. E.g., Olivas, supra note 1, at 582 ("Because it is a private college, Stanford is
not required to abide by First Amendment jurisprudence, although in ... matters of free
speech, they have chosen to adhere to the higher standard.").
42. See id. at 581-82.
43. Justice Douglas explained that
academic freedom ... is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.... The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
than through any kind of authoritative selection."
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (emphasis added) (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 279 n.2 (1981) (" 'It is
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to specula-
tion, experiment and creation' " (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263
(1957))); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (noting that freedom of speech must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or First Amendment protection will eventually be denied to
ideas we cherish); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) ("Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.").
44. See Rabban, supra note 39, at 244.
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The Court indirectly has imposed certain limitations upon academic
freedom, because employees of academic institutions are treated almost
identically to all other public employees. 45 Although the Court has not
limited directly academic freedom through the public employee doctrine,
it has constricted the rights of faculty at public institutions. According to
case law, speech on matters of public concern is constitutionally pro-
tected, while speech on internal institutional matters is entitled to consid-
erably less protection.46 A university's need to maintain orderly
operations and to regulate its own affairs essentially outweighs the em-
ployee's speech interest.4 ' Furthermore, the Court has stated expressly
that academic freedom protects neither intimidating acts and actual
threats nor disruptive acts interfering with an educational program. 8
Another source of academic freedom is the AAUP's 1940 Statement
on Academic Freedom and Tenure (1940 Statement).4 9 This Statement
establishes guidelines for a faculty member's academic freedom, but it
applies only to those public and private institutions that have adopted
it.5" The authoritative status of the Statement is not clear. Although it
45. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that public
employees may exercise their right to speak on issues of community importance without
fear of termination unless the statements are intentionally false or reckless).
46. Id. at 572-74; see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983) (holding that the
Court will intervene to protect speech on matters of public concern but will not challenge
personnel decisions reprimanding employees who speak out on matters of personal inter-
est). For a discussion of Pickering, see William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and
the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical
Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 94 n.44, 102-05 nn.68-75.
47. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987) (recognizing that an indi-
vidual's First Amendment rights may be outweighed by a strong state interest in maintain-
ing efficient performance or enterprise); see also Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1914
(1994) (making it easier for employers to terminate employees whose speech is disruptive
to the work environment).
48. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) ("A school need not
tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission ....... (quot-
ing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189
(1972) (stating that the First Amendment does not protect speech disturbing the discipline
of the school); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969) (holding that speech that disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or inva-
sion upon the rights of others will not be protected); Van Alstyne, supra note 46, at 123.
49. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3, 3 (1990) (stating that the Statement aims "to promote public
understanding and support of academic freedom and tenure") [hereinafter AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS].
50. Id. at 3-4.
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does not necessarily constitute a code of professional conduct, it does rec-
ommend an approach to academic freedom issues.
5'
The Statement declares that the search for truth justifies academic free-
dom and demands liberty to teach and publish one's own ideas.52 Again,
however, academic freedom does not exist without limitations. For exam-
ple, a teacher "should be careful not to introduce into [his or her] teach-
ing controversial matter which has no relation to [his or her] subject."53
Additionally, when "speak[ing] or writ[ing] as [a] citizen[]. . . . [the
teacher has] special obligations .... [He or she] should at all times be
accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, [and] should show respect
for the opinions of others . . . ." Thus, according to the AAUP's stan-
dards, a faculty member has freedom to speak, teach, and research when
acting with fairness and courtesy.
55
The AAUP's 1940 Statement is not the only source from which the
parameters of academic freedom have been shaped. The predecessor of
the 1940 Statement is the AAUP's 1915 General Report of the Commit-
tee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which espouses a view that is sim-
ilarly limited.56 The 1987 Statement on Professional Ethics also is
51. See id. The preface to the Statement indicates that representatives of the AAUP
and the Association of American Colleges agreed upon a restatement of principles set
forth in a 1925 Statement following a series of conferences begun in 1934. Id. at 3.
52. Id. (stating that "[tihe common good depends upon the free search for truth and
its free exposition").
53. Id.
54. Id. at 4.
55. See id. at 3-4.
56. General Report of the Committee of Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure
(1915), reprinted in LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 393, app. A 401. For
example, it states
Since there are no rights without corresponding duties, the considerations here-
tofore set down with respect to the freedom of the academic teacher entail certain
correlative obligations. The claim to freedom of teaching is made in the interest
of the integrity and of the progress of scientific inquiry; it, is, therefore, only those
who carry on their work in the temper of the scientific inquirer who may justly
assert this claim. The liberty of the scholar within the university to set forth his
conclusions, be they what they may, is conditioned by their being conclusions
gained by a scholar's method and held in a scholar's spirit; that is to say, they
must be the fruits of competent and patient and sincere inquiry, and they should
be set forth with dignity, courtesy, and temperateness of language. The university
teacher, in giving instruction upon controversial matters, while he is under no
obligation to hide his own opinion under a mountain of equivocal verbiage,
should, if he is fit for his position, be a person of a fair and judicial mind; he
should, in dealing with such subjects, set forth justly, without suppression or innu-
endo, the divergent opinions of other investigators; he should cause his students
to become familiar with the best published expressions of the great historic types
of doctrine upon the questions at issue; and he should, above all, remember that
his business is not to provide his students with ready-made conclusions, but to
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pertinent. It forbids "any exploitation, harassment, or discriminatory
treatment of students," and requires professors to "protect [students'] ac-
ademic freedom."
57
None of these sources of academic freedom justify or create an abso-
lute right to pursue any notion or to express any views without regard for
their veracity and their effect on others within the community.58 To the
contrary, these sources require faithfulness to the search for some version
of truth based upon available evidence and create a professional standard
of care.59
B. Dilemma Created by Competing Underlying Values
These sources of the right of academic freedom counsel against official
suppression of even highly offensive ideas, but simultaneously uphold ac-
ademic norms of civility and respect for others.6" An obvious tension
between the two values arises in many situations, such as when a profes-
sor expresses racist ideas that threaten the precarious position of persons
of color on college campuses, 61 or when a fraternity holds an "'ugly wo-
train them to think for themselves, and to provide them access to those materials
which they need if they are to think intelligently.
Id. at 401.
57. Statement of Professional Ethics (1987), in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra
note 49, at 75, 76. In 1992, the AAUP's Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure
(Committee A) adopted a statement, On Freedom of Expression and Campus Speech
Codes. On Freedom of Expression and Campus Speech Codes, ACADEME, July-Aug. 1992,
at 30, 30. It concludes that no campus speech should be sanctioned: "No viewpoint or
message may be deemed so hateful or disturbing that it may not be expressed." Id. My
conclusion is somewhat at odds with that of Committee A, as I endorse very limited sanc-
tions imposed on racist or other harassing speech as outlined in this Article.
58. See supra notes 41, 52-57 and accompanying text.
59. Letter from Matthew Finkin, Professor of Law, University of Illinois, to the author
(June 28, 1994). Professor Finkin explained that "because teaching, research, and publica-
tion are professional prerogatives to which the freedom attaches, the academic is held to a
professional standard of care. The expressing of a professional view without regard to its
veracity would be a breach of academic responsibility." Id. at 2.
60. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
61. E.g., Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 899-903 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (setting forth
racially controversial publications of plaintiff professor), aff'd in part and vacated in part,
966 F.2d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir.) (holding
that City College violated the professor's First Amendment rights by refusing to reappoint
him to his position as chair of the black studies department after a series of racist class-
room comments), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994); Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1097
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that a pattern of racist remarks by a professor in class "tends to
silence rather than promote the free exchange of ideas, and to destroy rather than enhance
academic diversity"), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 115 S.
Ct. 502 (1994). The Supreme Court recently overturned the Second Circuit opinion, re-
manding the case and instructing the lower court to reconsider its decision. Harleston v.
Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502, 502 (1994).
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man contest' " that includes an insulting blackface depiction of an over-
weight African-American woman. 62 No easy resolution of the tension
exists.63 To shelter one value is to expose and leave the other value rela-
tively unprotected.
The danger of censorship exacerbates the dilemma. Although history
is replete with examples of overzealous, politically-motivated enforce-
ment, First Amendment jurisprudence wisely eschews content-based sup-
pression of speech in most instances.' Evidence exists that codes are
invoked often against the very groups they were enacted to assist.
65
Given that those in power also hold disproportionate power to utilize
codes, this finding is not surprising. Advocates of regulation must con-
front this paradox and draft a policy that is clear and narrow.
66
Moreover, academic communities can thrive only in an atmosphere
that promotes free speech.67 Without tight constraints, attempts to regu-
late expressions of general or political opinion threaten to intrude upon
the expression and testing of ideas,68 the values at the heart of academic
freedom. This threat is particularly true with regard to unorthodox theo-
ries or radical views, as dominant paradigms cannot be overturned if new
ideas are not nurtured. Experience thus counsels caution in regulating
speech, lest legitimate academic exploration of controversial issues be
swept into a broadly-fashioned net.
Experience also teaches, however, that absolute freedom to debase
others, particularly members of historically oppressed groups, under-
mines their fragile position on campus and thus defeats diversity.
69
Counterspeech often is not an effective remedy for those in a relatively
powerless status, since the ability to engage in debate presupposes equal-
62. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386,
387-88 (4th Cir. 1993).
63. One possible resolution of this tension is to tolerate expression of general ideas or
opinions, but to sanction expressions of racial or other group-based hostility against indi-
viduals. See Stanford University Policy, supra note 32, at 450-51. An alternative and nar-
rower restriction would sanction only " 'fighting' words." See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that fighting words are not protected
speech).
64. See generally J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375 (analyzing the history of First
Amendment jurisprudence).
65. Strossen, supra note 6, at 557-58; William A. Henry III, The Politics of Separation,
TIME, Dec. 1993, at 73 (stating that over half of all university charges were brought against
minorities).
66. See Olivas, supra note 1, at 583.
67. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note 49, at 3.
68. See Rabban, supra note 39, at 229.
69. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066,1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
ity. 71 Meanwhile, the very powerlessness of vulnerable groups often ren-
ders them voiceless. 7 Only the most intrepid women and people of color
would dare to speak out against harassment in situations in which they
are vastly outnumbered and overpowered.72
Harassment undermines and threatens victims' ability to learn and
function effectively. 73 Individually directed verbal harassment can be as
harmful as physical threats.74 In essence, at least some harassing speech
directed toward individuals does not express an idea.75 Instead, it con-
veys a visceral threat, a raw assertion and affirmation of power that is a
challenge to the victim's very being.76
Thus, the conflict between freedom and equality is presented.77 The
underlying question is not which value is more important, but rather,
70. See Balkin, supra note 64, at 396.
71. See MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 113.
72. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 453-54.
73. Id. at 457-66; Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action For Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136-37 (1982) (indicat-
ing that racist insults can produce devastating consequences for victims, including
humiliation, isolation, and self-hatred); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2320, 2336 (1989) (relating that the physi-
cal and emotional effects of racist remarks can range from nightmares and post-traumatic
stress disorder to psychosis and suicide).
Empirical studies have determined that sexual harassment severely affects victims both
in the workplace and in academic situations. Victims commonly report symptoms of severe
stress, loss of motivation and self-confidence, interference with ability to work, adverse
effects on their physical health, or changes in their career plans. Peggy Crull, The Stress
Effects of Sexual Harassment on the Job, reprinted in MICHELE A. PALUDI & RICHARD B.
BARICKMAN, ACADEMIC AND WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 133 app. 4, at 137-40
(1991) [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT]; Michele A. Paludi & Richard Barickman, Sex-
ual Harassment of Students: Victims of the College Experience, reprinted in SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT, supra, at 149 app. 5, at 154 ("The consequences of being harassed to
undergraduate and graduate women have been devastating to their physical well-being,
emotional health, and vocational development, including depression, insomnia, headaches,
helplessness, decreased motivation."). See generally JUDITH L. HERMAN, TRAUMA AND
RECOVERY (1992) (analyzing the long term effects of harassment on trauma survivors).
74. See Crull, supra note 73, at 140.
75. See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993)
("Courts should uphold very narrow, content-based restrictions on hate speech if the
speech in question is not reasonably taken to be part of the exchange of ideas.").
76. Lawrence, supra note 14, at 453-55; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 47-55 (1979).
77. Thomas C. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case of Discriminatory Verbal
Harassment, 63 J. HIGHER EDUC. 485, 485-86 (1992). Professor Grey illustrates the
conflict:
Like the pornography issue, the harassment problem illustrates the element of
paradox in the conflict of civil-liberties and civil-rights perspectives or mentalities.
This problem does not simply trigger familiar disagreements between liberals of a
classical or libertarian orientation as against those of a welfare state or social
democratic one-though it does sometimes do that. In my experience, the issue
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what works to diminish harassment without unduly constraining aca-
demic freedom. There is no ultimate philosophical resolution of the ten-
sion between these two values. Freedom and equality are not only polar
opposites in their application to many situations, but are irreconcilable in
a Cartesian system.
7 8
Nonetheless, academic institutions must achieve a pragmatic settlement
of the conflict between values when harassment occurs.7 9 Although no
final principles decide the conflict, more limited principles provide gui-
dance.8" For instance, decision makers should examine carefully the les-
sons of history, as well as the positions and rights of the members of the
community."' In addition, decision makers should be sensitive to both
the context in which the conflict occurs and the perspectives of the actors,
while respecting their differences.82 I also believe that experience man-
dates an individually targeted limitation and that some type of reasona-
bleness standard should be employed to determine what constitutes
harassment. 83 Beyond that, particular aspects of a policy will vary from
institution to institution, depending on the existing circumstances.
also has the power to appear to a single person in different shapes and suggest
different solutions as it oscillates between being framed in civil-liberties and civil-
rights terms. At the same time, however, it remains recognizably the same
problem.
Id.; see Delgado, supra note 27, at 345-48 (discussing the conflict between freedom and
equality).
78. See Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
63, 103 n.174 (1993); see also Grey, supra note 77, at 486.
79. See 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, supra note 49.
80. See id.
81. See infra text accompanying note 222 (distinguishing rights as defined under
AAUP Model Policy from those available under the EEOC standard of harassment).
82. See Williams, supra note 78, at 103. Speaking of the epistemological theories of
Martha Nussbaum and other feminist scholars, which elaborate on these principles, Wil-
liams explains: "They seek to define a middle ground denied by Cartesianism. The princi-
ples they suggest are not transcendent because they are tied to human experience, subject
to constant revision in light of that experience, and susceptible to real cultural variation."
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. Many formulations of a reasonableness standard are available. The most common
is the reasonable person standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift
System, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993). Many courts and commentators have endorsed a
reasonable woman standard, in the case of sexual harassment, or a reasonable victim stan-
dard for other forms. E.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"men and women will learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the opposite
sex"); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (suggesting a reasonable
woman standard for sexual harassment cases). Numerous scholarly articles explore the
concept. E.g., Jane L. Dolkart, Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and
the Shaping of Legal Standards, 43 EMORY L.J. 151, 152 (1994) (arguing for an individual-
ized standard focusing on the conduct of the harasser and its effect on the actual plaintiff's
work environment).
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Therefore, sanctions should not be permissible in the example
presented at the beginning of this section concerning a professor who ex-
pressed racist opinions in class, as long as the opinions did not target indi-
viduals.84 If the obvious targets are not individuals, one should employ a
contextual analysis to determine whether the expressions are the func-
tional equivalent of targeted insults. Ostensibly nondirected remarks that
really are veiled attacks on individual members of disfavored groups who
are present would constitute such expressions.85
Beginning with a presumption that nontargeted remarks are not action-
able,86 one factor that may rebut this presumption is whether the stated
opinions pertained to the subject addressed in that class and were within
the professional expertise of that faculty member.87 If they were gratui-
tous and irrelevant to the class material, the decision maker could inquire
further whether the intent and effects were essentially those of individu-
ally directed harassment. 88
Alternatively, the decision maker could proceed directly to an analysis
of intent and effects, bypassing the professional expertise inquiry. Argua-
84. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; cf Smith v. Atkins, 622 So. 2d 795, 797
(La. Ct. App. 1993) (deciding defamation action in favor of a plaintiff law student against a
professor who called her a " 'slut' " in class).
85. See Delgado, supra note 73, at 180 (explaining that a directed statement might be
actionable if a reasonable person would consider it an insult in the particular context).
86. Individually targeted harassment thus becomes the paradigm into which any ex-
ceptions must fit. See Strossen, supra note 6, at 493 (stating that hate speech regulation
would not apply unless the speech was directly targeted at a specific individual). The sub-
committee to the AAUP Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure that drafted a
proposed revised sexual harassment model policy, and to which I served as a consultant,
considered employing such a presumption, but then rejected it. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 220-21.
87. Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professional Academic Freedom: Second
Thoughts on the Third "Essential Freedom," 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1843-46 (1993) (ex-
plaining that academic freedom should protect only professionally-related speech).
88. The sexual harassment policy subcommittee to the AAUP Committee A on Aca-
demic Freedom and Tenure included an intent and effects standard in its definition of
veiled targeted conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 220-21; supra note 82; see also
Robin M. Hulshizer, Comment, Securing Freedom from Harassment Without Reducing
Freedom of Speech: Doe v. University of Michigan, 76 IOWA L. REV. 383, 387 n.30 (1991)
(stating that severity of sanctions is dependent upon the intent of the accused and the
effect of the conduct).
It reportedly has been common for anatomy professors to use nude magazine
centerfolds of women to study female anatomy. Although such a use of the pictures is
both gratuitous and highly offensive, it is not clear that it would meet the standard sug-
gested here, as it does not necessarily indicate a target. By contrast, a colleague of mine
related to me that a former professor of his in college would lead the mostly male class in a
chorus of boos when a woman student entered the room, because he felt that it inhibited
his freedom to make off-color remarks. That is the sort of targeted harassment that my
suggested policy primarily covers.
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bly, that issue is subsumed within an analysis of intent.8 9 For example,
tne could infer an intent to harass if the statements had nothing to do
with the subject matter of the class, but did concern the presence of wo-
men in the class. 9 Less justification exists if the statements were gratui-
tous.91 The presence of such factors could convert an oblique, apparently
nondirected remark into a directed attack. 92 This is more likely to occur
89. See William A. Kaplin, "Hate Speech" on the College Campus: Freedom of Speech
and Equality at the Crossroads, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 243, 256 n.23 (1992) (explain-
ing that to establish harassment, it must be shown that the speaker intended to harass the
victim).
90. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (stating, as
an example of sanctionable conduct, that a man who makes remarks in class such as
" '[women just aren't as good in this field as men' " creates a hostile learning atmosphere
for females in the class).
91. See PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 85 (1991) (com-
menting that the use of gratuitous and voyeuristic language is highly inappropriate).
92. See Alison G. Myhra, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68
N.D. L. REV. 71, 82 (1992) (suggesting that a speaker's racial or sexual comments also
impact nontargeted individuals). Robert O'Neil constructed for the AAUP Committee A
subcommittee revising sexual harassment policy a set of hypotheticals that conceivably
could fall within the category of prohibited, nondirected expression by a faculty member:
A. A male faculty member tells sexist jokes (relevant to the course subject
matter) to a class that is overwhelmingly male.
B. A male faculty member makes sexually offensive or demeaning remarks
outside class to a group of students (or colleagues or staff) that includes some
women.
C. A male faculty member teaching a course on modem military history inter-
sperses nude female pinups in his slides of war machinery and battle scenes to
great guffaws of laughter from male students, and much offense to female
students.
D. The same male professor of modern military history illustrates a lecture on
"Front Line Morale During World War II" with replicas of actual pinup posters
and calendars of scantily clad female models preserved among servicemen's
memorabilia, remarking to the class that "items like these kept our troops going
after D Day."
E. A male professor of creative writing occasionally uses in class sexually sug-
gestive and offensive, but subject-relevant, analogies such as "focus in writing is a
lot like the sex act" and (gesturing with his hands on this one) "a lively story can
arouse you just like the gyrations of a belly dancer."
F. A male professor of criminal law illustrates the prosecutor's dilemma by
noting a very high incidence of sexual assault complainants who, after filing
charges, declined to proceed and thus embarrassed the prosecutor.
G. A male faculty member in a professional school publicly attacks a pro-
posed affirmative action plan for the recruitment of women by arguing that "the
admission of women on a preferential basis will lower the quality of education we
offer and will debase the value of the degree we confer."
H. The same male professor, after calling in class upon a female student who
was unprepared, turns away from the class and makes the same statement, to no
one in particular, but in an audible "stage whisper."
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in a class containing a small number of students of color, women students,
or other members of disfavored groups.93
For instance, assume that a female law student is unprepared for a torts
class and is unable to answer the male professor's question. He then
turns from her to the class and remarks, in an elaborate stage whisper,
that the law school's affirmative action plan to recruit women is clearly
misguided. This ostensibly nondirected remark actually demeans this
particular woman student and, as such, should be actionable.94 The re-
mark is unrelated to torts and circumstances indicate a likely intent to
harass, as well as a likely deleterious effect on the student.
The standard also could be met in a large class, containing few women,
in a male-dominated field such as engineering. For example, the profes-
sor may repeatedly state that women are irrational and generally unfit for
the profession and may refuse to recognize or call upon the women stu-
dents.95 If he does acknowledge and engage in dialogue with the male
students, the refusal to acknowledge the women creates a nexus between
those individual women and the disparaging remarks. The circumstances
indicate a demeaning intent, and the women would feel vulnerable and
highly offended.96
Robert O'Neil, Memorandum to the AAUP Committee A subcommittee revising the
model sexual harassment policy (on file with the author). Although a detailed contextual
analysis is necessary, I would respond that my proposed policy would not cover hypotheti-
cal A in most circumstances; B may be covered if circumstances indicate the likelihood of
an individual target. Hypothetical C involves gratuitous use of pornography, having a neg-
ative effect on the women students, and therefore a further inquiry into the professor's
intent is required. Most likely academic freedom protects D. Hypotheticals E (apparently
based on the Silva case), F, and G are acceptable and not actionable. Hypothetical H,
however, is prohibited, as it is essentially a targeted remark.
93. Libel law contains precedent for this interpretation. Allegedly defamatory re-
marks may be "of and concerning the plaintiff" even if they pertained to a small group of
persons, of which the individual plaintiff was a member. Bornmann v. Star Co., 66 N.E.
723, 725 (N.Y. 1903) (Haight, J., dissenting); see also Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris,
377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962) (holding that an article libeled every member of a football
team, including the plaintiff, even though he was not specifically named), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 513 (1964); Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 682, 690 (1988) (stating that group libel affects individuals because it shows a lack of
respect for the individuality of the group members).
94. By contrast, if the remark did not follow a dialogue with this particular individual,
it should be protected. See O'Neil, supra note 92, at 1-2. This example was originally
created by Matt Finkin.
95. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
University Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of Students in the
University Environment unconstitutional because the policy swept in protected First
Amendment speech issues to its forbidden activities).
96. See Mark Cammack & Susan Davies, Should Hate Speech Be Prohibited in Law
Schools?, 20 Sw. U. L. REV. 145, 164 (1991) (concluding that differential treatment of male
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In the absence of such a nexus between the individual female students
and the remarks, a decision maker would have more difficulty finding an
intent to harass these women. It is unlikely, however, that any professor
inclined to utter such sexist remarks would confine his sexist behavior to
making general statements in class. His behavior is likely to extend to his
treatment of individual women in the class as well.
The example posed at the beginning of this section concerning the fra-
ternity party is more problematic, because the "'ugly woman contest'"
was not an exchange of ideas occurring in a professional environment. 7
The African-American women on campus would be extremely offended
and harmed, 98 assuming they were aware of it. Nonetheless, because it
involved expressive activity99 and no captive audience was present,' 00 the
university probably should not prohibit the contest as long as it did not
target specific individuals.' '
If there were only a handful of overweight black women on campus,
however, they easily could feel singled out and perhaps could argue that
the depiction was directed at each of them individually' 0 2 Again, one
could inquire further whether both the intent and effects of the depiction
were focused enough to suggest the ugly woman contest constituted a
veiled personal attack. Because the requisite intent most likely could not
be shown, however, the university could not discipline the actors.
The risks attending the drafting of a highly subjective, and thus over-
broad, policy justify leaving most such incidents unredressed. °3 For the
and female students in the classroom creates a hostile learning environment that causes
women to stay silent in class).
97. Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 387
(4th Cir. 1993) (commenting that the " 'ugly woman contest' " was part of the " 'Derby
Days' "event, which was planned both as entertainment and as a source of funds for chari-
table donations).
98. Id, at 388 (describing one character in the skit as offensively depicting a black
woman and emulating African-American slang in a satirical manner).
99. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 769 (1988)
(stating that courts must look "to whether the activity in question is commonly associated
with expression").
100. Iota Xi Chapter, 993 F.2d at 389 (noting that the Fraternity staged the contest in
the cafeteria of the Student Union); see infra text accompanying notes 153-54 (discussing
the captive audience problem).
101. See Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Institutions: A
Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 376 (1991) (stating that speech that takes
place in a dormitory or classroom, where there is a captive audience, can be differentiated
from speech that occurs at scheduled rallies and public addresses); cf White, supra note 1,
at A48 (arguing that a policy can ban hate speech in dormitories that it cannot ban in
classrooms under existing time, place, and manner analysis).
102. See supra note 60.
103. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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purposes of this Article, "subjective" is defined as lacking a common,
widely ascertainable standard. Our culture has no accepted or agreed-
upon criteria to judge what types of nondirected, impersonal attacks are
impermissible. Indeed, a brief conversation with friends and colleagues
will demonstrate the wide, sometimes astonishing, variety of opinions on
the subject, even within academia.
The inherent ambiguity of subjects such as sexuality or the social mean-
ing of race presents a paradigmatic problem for the drafter of a speech
policy. No authoritative exposition of the nature of human sexuality, for
instance, can ever capture its full meaning; its significance and relation to
other aspects of personhood will vary with the individual and her circum-
stances. Perhaps only literature can represent faithfully human struggles
with sexual issues. To clamp down on the struggle for understanding in
this arena by delineating a zone of acceptable expression inevitably will
chill honest exploration of the issue and the search for insight. Attempts
to impose a particular sensibility in this area will fail as surely as forced
conversions. 104
Humorous remarks, which depend highly on context and mood ("You
had to have been there"), pose a similar problem. An innocuous remark
in one setting can be tasteless and offensive in another. Irony presents
even more complex issues, because the listener must apprehend the state-
ment's double meaning to appreciate its humor. Taken literally or seri-
ously, ironic statements can convey a bias completely opposite of the
intended meaning.
10 5
Nonetheless, threats against or intimidation of individuals may be pro-
hibited. 10 6 General consideration of an issue should not be affected by
104. See Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Reg-
ulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 944 (1991).
105. Cf Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477,479 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (up-
holding discipline against a white basketball coach for directing a racial epithet toward his
African-American players, despite his claim that he meant it in a "positive and reinforcing"
manner).
106. Stanford University has a policy that draws this particular distinction. See supra
note 32; see also John T. Shapiro, Note, The Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship
or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 201, 230-31 (1990)
(suggesting a similar policy).
Prior to R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), courts struck down public
university policies that were considerably broader, on grounds of both vagueness and over-
breadth. See, e.g., U.W.M. Post v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1180 (E.D. Wis.
1991) (finding that a university's rule prohibiting the direction of discriminatory epithets at
individuals with the intent to demean and to create a hostile educational environment was
overly broad and unduly vague in part because it did not meet the requirements of the
fighting words doctrine); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-67 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (finding that a policy prohibiting individuals from "stigmatizing or victimizing" indi-
viduals or groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
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prohibitions on individualized harassment of a specific person that can
include oblique attacks and elliptical references. The line between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable behavior is ascertainable, and the search for
understanding cannot justify personal attacks or threatening sexual
advances.
Although it is possible that frivolous charges may be brought under the
suggested standard, defining harassment as individually targeted behavior
or its strictly defined equivalent should eliminate most nonmeritorious
charges. Furthermore, an objective requirement that harassment can ex-
ist only when a reasonable person in the victim's circimstances would
perceive it as such would provide additional protection."0 7
In addition, neither our collective cultural experience nor First Amend-
ment case law completely forbids content-based restrictions in limited
arenas.1" 8 Obscenity, fighting words, and child pornography do not enjoy
constitutional protection; 0 9 nor does speech likely to incite or produceimminent lawless action. 11° The First Amendment also does not shelter
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or Vietnam-era veteran status and
containing no fighting words limitation was overly broad and vague, encompassing a signif-
icant amount of protected conduct within its scope).
107. Frivolous charges also have been brought under Title VII and section 1983, but
Congress evidently has decided that the benefit of these claims outweighs the cost of the
frivolous cases brought.
108. Although the United States Constitution allows only a few content-based restric-
tions, Canadian law has followed a different course. Canada's Criminal Code, section
319(2) prohibits an individual from "communicating statements, other than in private con-
versation, [which] wilfully promote[s] hatred against any identifiable group." Criminal
Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, sec. 319(2) (1985) (Can.). The law was challenged as a contraven-
tion of section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights, which guarantees "freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press," CAN. CO NST. pt. 1,
§ 2(b), and appeals courts came down on both sides of the issue.
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina v. Andrews, 77 D.L.R.4th 128 (Can. 1990),
noted that section 319(2) undermined freedom of expression by including expressions of
sincerely held, albeit erroneous, opinions within its ambit. Id. at 139. Unlike the United
States Constitution, section 1 of the Canadian Charter expressly subjects all granted rights
and freedoms "to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society." CAN. CONST. pt.1, § 1. The court declared that the aim
of section 319(2) constituted a pressing and substantial objective under section 1. Andrews,
77 D.L.R.4th at 136-37. It found that the means chosen were proportional to the valid
objective because use of the word "hatred" prevented an unduly wide limitation on free-
dom of expression. Id. at 137. Furthermore, use of the word "'wilfully' " added a strin-
gent mens rea requirement. Id. at 138. In contrast, a United States court would almost
surely consider legislation banning the promotion of hatred vague and overbroad. See
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
109. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 573 (1942) (fighting words).
110. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
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fraud and perjury,'11 or treason implemented by speech acts. 1 2 Like-
wise, defamatory utterances are actionable, 3 and content-based regula-
tions aimed at the secondary effects of the speech are permissible."
4
Verbal expressions of crime victim selection based on race can provide
evidence to enhance a criminal sentence." 5 Finally and most impor-
tantly, the First Amendment does not shelter "sexually derogatory 'fight-
ing words' " in the workplace.'
16
In other words, both the Supreme Court and our culture tend to rank
speech as having either high or low value, with political speech at the
apex' 17 and speech implementing or effectuating unlawful acts at the na-
dir." 8 Narrow and precise regulation of speech does not inevitably tum-
ble down the slippery slope into the abyss of censorship." 9 Rather,
careful regulation can coexist and even further free speech for both in-
sider and outsider voices.
The support of an institution as a whole, expressed in a rationally-en-
forced policy, can assure that outsiders and minorities flourish in an often
111. Balkin, supra note 64, at 396.
112. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
114. Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1856 (1992) (upholding prohibition of elec-
tioneering within 100 feet of a polling place); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult theaters within 1000
feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school).
115. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201-02 (1993).
116. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
117. Speech on public issues represents " 'the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values.'" NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); see also Calvin R. Massey, Hate
Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 103, 135 (1992) ("Not all speech is created equal. The constitutional law of free
expression is rife with categories of speech, each receiving a different quantum of constitu-
tional protection from suppression .. "). Some members of the Court, however, oppose
ranking speech, finding the process inherently subjective. See Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The fact that the 'offensive'
speech here may not address 'important' topics ... does not mean that it is less worthy of
constitutional protection."); see also Daniel A. Farber, Content Regulation and the First
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 730 (1980) (observing that Supreme
Court cases allowing regulations based on content "seem puzzling and unintelligible only
because one is distracted from the real issues by the alluring mirage of content neutrality");
T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 519, 550 (1979) (noting that "it is difficult to construct a principled argument for
restriction [of offensive expression] that is consistent with our policy towards other forms
of expression").
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL OF Riirrs IN THE MODERN
STATE 255, 301-04 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
119. Id. at 309. If falling down the slippery slope were inevitable, any regulation would
lead to censorship and thus none would be imposed. Sunstein points out, however, that
limitations on speech do not invariably produce censorship. Id.
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hostile environment. That support may require sanctioning certain per-
sonal insults based on characteristics such as race or gender.12 Effective
institutional support would curb not only particular acts of harassment,
but also would help create a climate that encourages diversity. That cli-
mate may help attract a critical mass of women and people of color on
campus and thereby have the further salutary effect of reducing the inci-
dence of harassment.121
Once again, I distinguish intimidating personal insults and the unusual
case of ostensibly nondirected but provable operatively equivalent state-
ments from general expressions of opinion concerning a group. The lat-
ter cannot be prohibited because they more directly implicate the
academic freedom of the speaker. That is not to say that nondirected
expressions of racist or sexist opinion cannot cause severe harm. Because
racism and sexism address core characteristics of social identity, these
opinions easily can invade and shake one's conscious sense of being and
belonging. The threat is heightened, however, when the insult is directed
at an individual, either subtly or overtly, and thus becomes a personal
attack. 22
Concededly, drawing the line between specific and general remarks
means that some harmful, extremely offensive speech will be unpunished
by a university. The regulation of general expression, however, is so in-
120. One also may add a requirement that the insults rise to the level of fighting words,
to pass First Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court, however, appears to have nar-
rowed the definition of fighting words to only those words that tend to provoke an immedi-
ate breach of the peace. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). The problem with
such a limitation is that it is inapplicable to the behavior of many harassment victims, who
typically respond by withdrawing or freezing in panic, rather than lashing out. See MACK-
INNON, supra note 22, at 113; Jean A. Hamilton, Emotional Consequences of Victimization
and Discrimination in "Special Populations" of Women, 12 PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC N. AM. 35,
36-37 (1989) (indicating that a woman may be overwhelmed by an abusive experience and
respond by dissociating herself from the intolerable effects); Lawrence, supra note 14, at
453-55; Matsuda, supra note 73, at 2336, 2370-71.
Moreover, R.A.V. struck down an ordinance whose reach was limited to "fighting
words" because it was content-based, applying only to race, gender, and religion. R.A.V.,
112 S. Ct. at 2547. Sanctioning all harassment, rather than selective group-based harass-
ment, avoids the problems of viewpoint discrimination raised in R.A.V.
121. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-03 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, professor of psychology at the University of Massa-
chusetts and plaintiff's expert witness). Dr. Fiske testified that until members of a particu-
lar group, such as women, constitute 15 or 20% of a workforce, they are viewed as rarities
or solos and subjected to harsher scrutiny than members of the majority group. Id. at 1503.
122. See Lawrence, supra note 14, at 452-57. Some take issue with this formulation,
contending that broad-based attacks are more dangerous and difficult to counter. When
discriminatory comments are addressed dispassionately toward an entire group, the
strength of the speaker's conviction of those prejudiced beliefs is arguably greater than
when the derogatory remarks result from a heated dispute between two individuals.
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:97
herently subjective that it is essentially impossible to create a standard
that also will not chill legitimate exploration of ideas. In these cases, the
risks and dangers of unrestrained prosecutions outweigh even the griev-
ous harm that words can cause.
123
III. BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITH A
COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTION
Despite the need for limited social intervention to safeguard each com-
munity member's physical and psychological well-being, Americans his-
torically have preferred a libertarian, marketplace of ideas approach to
resolving differences, in part because it resonates with our individualistic
cultural values. The academic counterpart to a verbal duel seems more
effective, and less dangerous, than university-imposed limitations on the
right to untrammeled free expression. 124 Moreover, to many Americans,
the harms occasioned by verbal attacks on members of groups based on
immutable characteristics pale in comparison to the looming specter of
censorship.125 This is particularly true in academia, where limitations on
expression could stifle the learning process. 126 Bias against restraint of
expression, however, distorts appreciation of the countervailing harm
that exclusion causes victims. 127 Thus, sanctioning a narrow range of
speech that effectuates or accompanies personal intimidation based on
123. Policies should be further tailored to emphasize conduct instead of speech. White,
supra note 1, at A48. When the speech component of behavior is ancillary to action the
threat to speech is minimized.
124. Indeed, it is not just American, but post-Enlightenment modernism in general, that
exalts the individual over the collectivity, and presumes that each "individual is supremely
responsible for causing the unequal situation he or she occupies," which effectively legiti-
mizes inequality within the social structure. R.C. Lewontin, Women Versus the Biologists,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 7, 1994, at 31.
125. See Rorie Sherman, Crime's Toll on the U.S.: Fear, Despair and Guns, NAT'L L.J.,
Apr. 18, 1994, at Al, A19-A20 (discussing Americans' intense commitment to civil liberties
even in the face of violent crime). For instance, in a recent poll taken by The National Law
Journal, only 12% of Americans surveyed supported legislation that would restrict televi-
sion violence: "The public says free expression is to be jealously guarded despite its over-
whelming belief that television, pornography, rap music and video games tend to
encourage crime and violence." Id. at A19. Thus, although most Americans believe that
some media of communication and avenues of expression feed criminal impulses, they
nonetheless overwhelmingly hesitate to advocate limitations on free speech. Id.
126. See Rabban, supra note 39, at 239-40 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which the Court reiterated that
academia functions as a marketplace of ideas to encourage active verbal exchanges).
127. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the
harm to the active exchange of ideas that racist remarks cause when the remarks go un-
checked in the classroom), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
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group membership need not be perceived as a threat to academic free-
dom. In fact, such restrictions might enhance it.
In resolving the conflict between academic freedom and speech codes,
the application of a conimunitarian model to the university setting may
provide a principled framework to curb the excesses of American individ-
ualism without imposing a regime of censorship. 128 This communitarian
model seeks to achieve a practical balance of interests,129 one that abhors
censorship but recognizes and justifies the need for limited regulation of
expression. Accordingly, an academic community must determine when
it is appropriate to rely upon either individualism or multiculturalism13
and resolve competing values through an examination of a dispute's con-
text.13 1 In this way, academic conflicts can be addressed within a struc-
ture that provides a means to effectuate both the need to encourage the
marketplace of ideas and the need to safeguard individual dignity.
Under this view, the academic community as a whole, not just the
faculty as individuals, or as a group opposed to students or the institution,
128. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991) (exploring a reformula-
tion of the current social discourse that overemphasizes individual civil rights into a dis-
course that emphasizes communitarian responsibility). One commentator explained:
When community begins to erode, communitarian movements sometimes arise
to offer solutions. Recognizing the fragility of society, communitarians are cen-
trally concerned with the "social glue" that binds people together. Communitari-
ans understand that personal fulfillment and social order depend on the secure
attachments and moral frameworks which only communities can offer. In periods
of great social dislocation, a communitarian politics may be the only viable alter-
native to such dangerous phenomena as nativism and fascism which spring up
proffering the illusion of relief from economic or spiritual pain. Communitarian-
ism, in contrast, is a politics of meaning, which speaks to our need for belonging
and purpose. At its best, it produces new values and institutions that can bring us
together with greater civility and humanity.
Charles Derber, Coming Glued: Communitarianism to the Rescue, TIKKUN, July-Aug. 1993,
at 27, 27 (1993). With this focus, the individual would conceptualize himself or herself
within the larger society, thereby minimizing the harmful consequences of individualism.
Id.
129. Michael Walzer, Multiculturalism and Individualism, DISSENT, Spring 1994, at 185,
191 (balancing the larger cultural values associated with multiculturalism and the more
self-oriented values associated with individualism to retain the benefits of each).
130. Id. (contending that this shifting balance, a form of social democracy, provides the
necessary structure for the resolution of conflict through a flexible understanding of when
to focus on either the individual or the group).
131. See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW
AND SOCIETY 247, 266-68 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (defending a con-
textual approach to understanding and resolving problems that, on their face, seem to pres-
ent a straightforward application of law and policy, yet in reality involve unique
configurations of factors that must be evaluated within their full context).
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retains academic freedom.132 The community is an aggregation of indi-
viduals, each of whom has rights and interests that exist in relation to
those of other community members.133 It comprises individuals of both
genders, as well as members of various racial, ethnic, and religious
groups. Although interests can diverge, the individuals in the community
share the common goal of promoting education.1 34 To achieve this goal,
each member must exercise the maximum amount of academic freedom
necessary to stimulate the learning process without impinging upon the
freedoms of another.' 35 Thus, justice is attainable when an institution
recognizes and balances the rights, interests, and needs of all of the mem-
bers who comprise its academic community.
Individuals need the protection of the community's academic freedom
to flourish in the marketplace of ideas. Conversely, the community relies
on the academic freedom that its members exercise to effectuate the free-
dom that the entire community possesses.136 We are social beings, but
that does not require losing individual identity in that of the collective.
137
132. The American tradition of academic freedom does not include a well-developed
theory of students' academic freedom. Nevertheless, everyone in the academic community
shares in and partakes of academic freedom. See Rabban, supra note 39, at 236-37.
133. See generally Cary v. Board of Educ., 427 F. Supp. 945 (D. Colo. 1977) (holding
that a high school teacher's academic freedom is subject to restraints necessary to recog-
nize the interests of the other members of the community), aff'd, 589 F.2d 535 (10th Cir.
1979).
134. See id. at 949 (discussing the education of students as they prepare for citizenship
as another goal of safeguarding academic freedom).
135. Positing academic freedom as belonging to the entire academic community does
not require a notion that group rights trump individual rights, although it can be conceptu-
alized in that fashion. The community's academic freedom is largely the sum total of that
of each individual member. The community also could retain academic freedom not as a
right, but as a means to further the educational mission of the university. That is achieved
in part by "juggling prerogatives of student and teacher [, which] might enhance open
exchange of views." Letter from Thomas Haskell, Professor of History, Rice University, to
the author 7 (June 9, 1994) (on file with the author).
136. Cf Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1, 6 art. 29, U.N. Doc. A/810,
U.N. Sales No. E.88.XIV.1 (1988) ("Everyone has duties to the community in which alone
the free and full development of his personality is possible.").
137. See Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REV. 727, 728. Kohler elucidates one reason for the difficulty Americans have in
engaging in the individualist-communitarian debate:
[W]e have only the language of individualism in which to pursue our questions
and carry on our discussion. The paucity of meanings that this language carries
with it leaves us with an enormous conceptual blind-spot: we can only compre-
hend individuals. We almost cannot conceive of groups or communities. This fact
pushes us to posit a tremendously restricted set of possibilities. We are left to
regard groups as representing affiliations among discrete, monadic and otherwise
unassociated individuals, or to reify the group as the single, sole individual.
Either way, we end up by denying something crucial about ourselves. We implic-
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Even an individual's sense of autonomy is conditioned by and arises out
of existence of the community.' 38 Likewise, interdependence is a sine
qua non of education, as learning cannot occur in isolation. If the as-
serted academic freedom (or license) of a professor undermines that of a
student,'39 the diminution of the entire community's academic freedom
may be the net result.' 40 Therefore, as the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit observed in Martin v. Parrish, "[t]he 'rights' of
the speaker are ... always tempered by a consideration of the rights of
the audience and the public purpose served, or disserved, by his [or her]
speech.'1
41
By providing a standard to differentiate the acceptable from the unac-
ceptable, this model inescapably takes a moral stance. The enforcement
and establishment of this moral position in practice impose restraints that
prohibit conduct the community views as egregious and unacceptable.
142
Because verbal and nonverbal behavior that threatens and intimidates
others can be extremely harmful to the educational process in general
and to diversity in particular, prohibitions on such behavior are accepta-
itly reject our character as social beings, or we submerge our particular and dis-
tinct individuality in the mass.
Id.
138. See id. at 730 (acknowledging that the community functions to ensure that the
individual attains a healthy existence, resulting in the ability to express oneself within a
democratic context); see also Laurie Zoloth-Dorfman, First, Make Meaning: An Ethics of
Encounter for Health Care Reform, TIKKUN, July-Aug. 1993, at 23-24. One commentator
explains the role of the community:
Rather than living in a world described and defined by the necessity of autono-
mous choice, freely made, most people actually live in the relational, obligatory,
and interconnected world, a world far messier and heavily freighted, far more
passionately loving and passionately hating than that described in philosophic
texts. Prior even to the conceptualization of the "self," of the autonomous being
with rights and bodily integrity, there is a self-in-relation, a self-in-connection, a
child born from the body of a woman into the waiting hands of another. Commu-
nity is prior to autonomy. We know that is true from the most common details of
an ordinary life and it is from these details that the language of justice must be
created.
Id. at 24.
139. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that "[t]he
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' . . . . depend[ing] upon ... wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas").
140. Or the freedom of a professor or student may be undermined by the conduct of
another student.
141. Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584 (5th Cir. 1986).
142. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The'State of Contemporary Politics and Culture, TIKKUN,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 50, 51 (stating that "the essence of morality is to establish and enforce
boundaries between the permissible and the impermissible").
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ble under the model.'43 Both individuals and the community must accept
some restraints to create a tolerant academic environment that supports
nonmajority perspectives or unconventional approaches." '
The model developed in this Article distinguishes the academic com-
munity from the community-at-large, where individuals in some cases
possess broader speech rights.' 45 The mission of the academy is to seek
knowledge in common in a rigorous and disciplined atmosphere, where
members are in close intellectual and physical proximity to other mem-
bers. Participation in this community requires that some rights be surren-
dered and some responsibilities assumed in exchange.' 46 Although the
"common mission" is difficult to define in a multicultural society, at the
very least it must include a commitment to respect the personhood of
others, especially those traditionally excluded.' 47 The intellectual and
cultural diversity of those views enhances the education of every member
of the academic community.'48 Forsaking absolute autonomy and
prohibiting threatening treatment of those diverse individuals, moreover,
does not create taboos on discussion of certain topics.'49 Rather, it fos-
ters thoughtful discussions and discourages mere ad hominem debate.' 5
In addition, the model builds upon the idea that the physically close
proximity of members of the academic community justifies restrictions on
143. Fox-Genovese further observes that the establishment of moral standards inevita-
bly implicates the relationship between individuals and the collectivity. Id. Moral stan-
dards can be established only by the group, and an individual's conduct is moral to the
extent that it adheres to those standards. Id. Thus, individuals cannot be "moral" in isola-
tion. Id.
144. This model presupposes that intellectual and cultural diversity are goods that rank
as high priorities of an educational institution. Cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (noting that "the quality of higher education ... is widely believed
to be promoted by a diverse student body").
145. For instance, when people are not in close proximity to each other, time, place, and
manner constraints become less compelling. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
146. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (regarding the need to sacrifice some
individual rights in exchange for participation in and improvements to the academic com-
munity). Moreover, this model may apply only to private academic institutions, where the
problems of meeting the standards of First Amendment case law and of conferring exces-
sive regulatory power on the government do not exist.
147. Cf. Mary Ann Glendon, Individualism and Communitarianism in Contemporary
Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 415. Glendon
explains that: "Effective protection for individual rights requires citizens who are willing to
respect the rights of others even at some cost to themselves .... The pluralistic nature of
most societies requires, in addition, citizens who are able to respect and appreciate the
cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage of others." Id.
148. As Judge Learned Hand observed, "[R]ight conclusions are more likely to be gath-
ered out of a multitude of tongues." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
149. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 144.
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time, place, and manner that are not applicable in other venues.151 In
many ways, students are a captive audience, unable to leave an oppres-
sive situation.' 52 Undeniably, many types of speech restrictions would be
unduly invasive in an open urban environment. There, it is generally pos-
sible to avoid more than passing, superficial contact with individuals
whose views and behavior stifle one's own.' 5 3 In the academic or other
community setting, however, consideration of others mandates partial
sublimation of an individual's own expressive behavior.154
IV. ENFORCEMENT
Still remaining is the question whether rational, even-handed enforce-
ment of limitations on academic speech is possible. Regulations that are
perfectly calibrated on paper may deteriorate rapidly into a blunt instru-
ment when applied. 5 5 Indeed, the most vexing problem speech restric-
tions pose is that the bureaucracy may lack the ability to recognize the
necessary fine distinctions among different types of behavior that are es-
sential to the delicate balancing of interests. This Article does not pro-
pose to answer the question fully.' 56 A narrowly tailored and clearly
stated policy, as well as the conferral of enforcement power only on indi-
151. The Supreme Court has endorsed broad time, place, and manner restrictions on
even protected expressive activity. Thus, for example, nude dancing can be banned despite
any potential expressive value. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991).
152. See Fong v. Purdue Univ., 692 F. Supp. 930, 951 (N.D. Ind. 1988), aff'd, 976 F.2d
735 (7th Cir. 1992). When speech is directed towards an audience that could not easily
avoid exposure to the speech, the Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on that form
of expression. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the FCC may prohibit offensive language in certain contexts); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding restrictions of political advertising
on city-owned buses to reduce "the risk of imposing upon the captive audience").
153. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (noting that people who find
the expression on an individual's jacket offensive could protect themselves "simply by
averting their eyes").
154. See supra note 151.
155. The Canadian experience with censoring pornography is instructive here. In 1992,
the Canadian Supreme Court, in Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (1992), upheld section
163(8) of the Criminal Code. Id. at 450-51. Section 163(8) defines as obscene "any publi-
cation a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any
one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence." Crimi-
nal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46 § 163(8) (1985) (Can.). Catharine MacKinnon and some femi-
nist groups heralded the decision as beneficial to women. MacKinnon/Dworkin "Theories"
Flunk Reality Test, CENSORSHIP NEWS (National Coalition Against Censorship) Issue 4,
No. 50 (1993), at I. The first publications censored after the Butler decision, however, were
gay and lesbian publications. Ruth Rosen, Not Pornography!, DISSENT, Summer 1994, at
343, 343. Since then, "[ulninformed and confused customs officials have also seized books
written by Oscar Wilde, Audrey Lorde, Marguerite Duras, and Jean Genet." Id. at 343-44.
156. See supra notes 136-50 and accompanying text.
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viduals sensitive to the importance of academic freedom, however, could
reduce heavy-handed enforcement.
15 7
While enforcement issues typically arise as due process questions, poli-
cies that are neither vague nor draconian can surmount this initial hurdle.
These policies provide notice and fair warning regarding the scope of pro-
hibited conduct and contain sanctions proportionate to the underlying be-
havior.'58 Additional problems arise when procedures are fundamentally
unfair. In one recent case, for example, unproved charges of harassment
were published, along with an implication of guilt, to the entire university
community.159 The alleged harasser did not receive advance notice of all
of the charges against him; an affirmative action officer of the university
interviewed a witness without his knowledge; and other procedural irreg-
ularities occurred. 6 ' More satisfactory procedures would alleviate many
of the problems universities experience with enforcement without deci-
mating policies.
To analyze these situations, I would suggest correlating adequacy of
procedures, sensitivity of personnel, and breadth of a policy. The better
the procedures and personnel, the more discretion a policy can allocate.
The inverse also would be true: the less precise the procedures and the
less sensitive the personnel, the more narrow and tightly constrained the
157. That is why I believe that sanctions on speech may be more workable in academic
settings. In general, enforcement personnel tend to be more highly educated and attuned
to the need for free expression than government administrators, although a regrettable
number of exceptions exist. If personnel at a particular institution are not sensitive to
academic freedom concerns, they should receive more training in that tradition.
158. Debate Over Faculty-Student Relations Intensifies, ACADEME, July-Aug. 1994, at 6,
6-7 [hereinafter Debate]. For instance, sanctions seem disproportionate in a recent case at
the University of Maine at Fort Kent. Id. The University of Maine dismissed history pro-
fessor Richard Dinsmore for sexual harassment for inviting a student to lunch three times,
assisting her in putting on her coat, sending her a note, touching her in class, and asking her
to take another course from him. Id. at 6. Dinsmore has filed a civil rights and defamation
suit against the school. Id. An arbitrator recently ordered Dinsmore reinstated, id., and
the university is presently contesting the finding in court. Questionable Conduct, A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1994, at 71. Unless the contents of the note were obscene or threatening, the
conduct does not appear sufficiently severe or pervasive to warrant dismissal. See Debate,
supra, at 6-7. More minor sanctions, however, might be appropriate.
159. Starishevsky v. Hofstra Univ., 612 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). In this
case, a disciplinary committee at Hofstra University found a professor who had kissed a
student and two employees not guilty of the sexual harassment charges filed against him.
Id. at 799-800. The university, however, fired the professor anyway, citing unethical, inap-
propriate, and unprofessional conduct (not a basis for discipline under the sexual harass-
ment guidelines). Id. The New York Supreme Court ordered the university to reinstate
Starishevsky, holding the dismissal arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, and violative of his
right to a fair hearing. Id. at 802.
160. Id. at 798-800.
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policy should be, perhaps prohibiting no more than the most egregious
directed harassment.
V. WHEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM MEETS THE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT,
DOES ANYONE EMERGE THE WINNER?
As mentioned previously, the potential for undermining academic free-
dom is great when a university policy prohibits creation of a hostile envi-
ronment based on race, sex, or other characteristics, particularly when
harassment need not be directed to an individual or is defined loosely. 6'
Nonetheless, within narrow parameters, hostile environment claims can
be important and powerful tools for fighting campus harassment without
chilling speech deserving of protection. By discouraging intimidating ex-
pressions, they can serve to maximize the mutual exchange of ideas in the
academic community at the same time.
Conceptualizing harassment as environmental is powerfully descriptive
and fitting because its consequences include not just hostility between a
harasser and a victim, but an incapacitating, overall sense of vulnerability
and alienation in the victim. 162 Self-esteem and confidence plummet, and
victims often report symptoms of depression that affect their ability to
function not only with the harasser, but within the university in gen-
eral.163 The consequences of harassing incidents reverberate within the
walls of the university, amplifying their effect in the mind of the victim
and creating the proscribed hostile or intimidating environment.'
6
6
The environment notion also is apt because the context within which
harassment takes place is critical to its analysis. If harassment of an indi-
vidual victim occurs and responsible institutional personnel fail to address
this conduct, what began as a problem between two people can mush-
room into an intimidating educational atmosphere. 65 If harassment of
others is allowed, the effect is much more debilitating. Moreover,
whether a victim feels the academic community supports or ignores her
plight greatly will affect her ability to overcome the situation.166 Indeed,
161. See supra note 126.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (recognizing that the term hostile envi-
ronment has been imported into antiharassment policies).
163. See supra text accompanying note 50.
164. See Grey, supra note 77, at 491.
165. See Matsuda, supra note 73, at 2371. While granting an alleged harasser adequate
due process does not signal support, ignoring harassing conduct or refusing to treat it seri-
ously sends a signal that the institution condones harassment. Id.
166. See id. at 2370-71. Tolerance by the university "is harmful to targets, who perceive
the university as taking sides through inaction, and who are left to their own resources in
coping with the damage wrought." Id. at 2371.
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if the community seems not only indifferent to the victim's plight, but also
supportive of the harasser, the victim's condition is likely to worsen.'6 7
The communitarian model is useful here. Because individuals function
within a community and require some degree of support and cooperation
to flourish, inertia and lack of response are not neutral or benign. 16 8 In-
stead, they signal that harassment is acceptable in that milieu, thereby
rendering victims' suffering more pervasive and invisible.16 9 By contrast,
if the university prohibits a hostile environment, it recognizes the various
forms of harassment and the resulting harm. Consequently, the univer-
sity demonstrates its commitment to equality, thus dignifying the vic-
tim.' 70 Effective enforcement then reinforces the commitment.
The hostile environment standard proposed cannot operate merely as
fog, a shrouded and lurking presence threatening to devour the unwary
(or to devour academic freedom).' 7 ' The targeted speech requirement
(or its functional equivalent) constrains it.'7 2 Interpretation of the hostile
environment standard, however, should be further constrained in accord-
ance with courts' construction of Title VII. These limitations place the
167. See id. at 2370-71 & n.250.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 163-67.
169. See generally RALPH ELLISON, INVIS1BLE MAN (1952). Ellison died recently, not
having written another novel since Invisible Man was published.
170. Title VII cases employ this principle when they ascribe great weight to whether an
employer responded promptly and effectively to a plaintiff's complaint of harassment. See,
e.g., Nash v. Electrospace Sys., 9 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding summary judg-
ment for defendant where employer acted swiftly to remedy the harassment); Anderson v.
Kelley, No. 92-6663, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 32963, at *21-22 (6th Cir. Dec. 15, 1993) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff failed to prove a claim of hostile environment where employer relo-
cated the plaintiff immediately after she reported harassment); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel,
881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that an employer was liable for harassment
where management took no action to remedy the situation). But see, e.g., Karibian v.
Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 780 (2d Cir.) (holding Columbia University liable for harass-
ment regardless of absence of notice or reasonableness of the school's complaint proce-
dures), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994).
171. Cf Rychlak, supra note 12, at 1428 (arguing that regulations at some universities
adversely affect the academic community by" 'fostering a decline in tolerance and a rise in
intellectual intimidation' ").
172. Another alternative limitation applying to faculty conduct determines whether the
behavior allegedly creating a hostile environment is clearly unprofessional, as that term
traditionally has been defined with respect to other types of unacceptable faculty conduct.
Academic Freedom and Sexual Harassment, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 64, 68-69 cmt.
(comment by Barbara F. Reskin). The AAUP Committee W on the Status of Women in
the Academic Profession recently proposed a similar standard. Id. at 69. To ensure that
the term" 'unprofessional' " is defined appropriately, the accused faculty person is entitled
to a peer review of the charges. Id. at 69 n.1. Others also have endorsed use of a profes-
sionalism standard. E.g., Mary W. Gray, It's Power, Stupid! 16 (1994) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). I am not yet persuaded, however, that this standard is
sufficiently ascertainable to provide an appropriate basis for sanctioning harassing speech.
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hostile environment concept within an existing interpretive tradition.
While the targeted speech limitation has its origin in constitutional and
defamation law,1 73 judicial interpretation of the hostile environment term
holds promise for application to the academic arena.'
74
For some time, case law decided under Title VII has recognized the
applicability of the hostile environment standard to both racial and sexual
harassment. 175 As Title VII sexual harassment law developed, the EEOC
and the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of two distinct cate-
gories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment.
176
The former consists of cases in which a job benefit is conditioned upon
sexual acquiescence. 77
By contrast, the hostile environment category includes all other types
of claims, operating almost as a catchall.178 Some analytical confusion
has arisen in defining a hostile environment because the courts and the
EEOC have used the term so broadly, to include even one-on-one harass-
ment.1 79 That use of the term is somewhat counterintuitive, because the
"environment" in such cases is that perceived by the victim.180 Nonethe-
173. See Olivas, supra note 87, at 1839-43 (providing examples of cases brought on First
Amendment grounds).
174. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986). A hostile environ-
ment has been consistently interpreted by the Supreme Court to mean an environment
that is permeated with "discriminatory intimidations, ridicule, and insult" that is " 'suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive ... [to] create an abusive working environment.'" Id. (quoting
Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (defining hostile environment similarly).
175. See supra note 30.
176. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67; Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993); see Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath of Meritor: A
Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718 (1989)
(distinguishing quid pro quo harassment, which can be likened to sexual blackmail, from
hostile environment sexual harassment, which primarily arises in the workplace environ-
ment and negatively affects the psychological well-being of the victim).
177. Vinciguerra, supra note 176, at 1718. Courts have construed this category nar-
rowly, upholding claims only where the quid pro quo nature of the situation is explicit. Id.
at 1717.
178. Id.; see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (condemning all sexual harassment that creates a
hostile work environment); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that
employer condonation of co-workers' unwelcome behavior created a hostile work environ-
ment); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that employ-
ers who create or condone a hostile environment violate Title VII); Rogers v. EEOC, 454
F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that the EEOC may investigate factual allegations
that could reasonably encompass unfair employment practices when a plaintiff alleges that
segregation of Hispanic parties created a hostile environment), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
179. See Vinciguerra, supra note 176, at 1718-19.
180. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993); Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm., Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 405:6681 (Mar. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Policy Guidance on Sexual
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less, when a supervisor (or professor) harasses a subordinate (or student),
she reasonably may perceive her entire work (or school) environment as
tainted.
According to the case law, hostile environment sexual harassment oc-
curs when unwelcome sexual conduct unreasonably interferes with an in-
dividual's job performance or creates a hostile, intimidating, or offensive
work environment.18' The conduct must be sufficient to alter the condi-
tions of employment' 8 2 and create an abusive working environment,
though a plaintiff need not prove psychological injury.' 8 3 A reviewing
court will consider the frequency and severity of the discriminatory con-
duct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether
the conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee's work perform-
ance.184 The alleged harasser is judged from the standpoint of a reason-
able person.' 185 Generally, more than a single incident is required to
constitute a hostile environment; a pattern of offensive conduct is neces-
sary.' 8 6 These standards illustrate the limitations that both the Supreme
Court and the EEOC have built into hostile environment claims.
187
Harassment]. The EEOC states that the harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the
objective standard of the reasonable person, taking into consideration the victim's perspec-
tive rather than stereotypical notions of acceptable behavior. Id.
181. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
182. Id.
183. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370-71. The Supreme Court explained that "[a] discriminato-
rily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psycho-
logical well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers." Id.
184. Id. at 371. In Harris, a female manager of Forklift Systems, Inc. sued Forklift
under Title VII, claiming the company's president created a hostile working environment.
id. at 369. Among other things, he called Harris "'a dumb ass woman,' " and said on
several occasions," 'You're a woman, what do you know?' " Id. On another occasion, the
president suggested to Harris that they " 'go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [her] raise.' "
Id. The Supreme Court declared that such conduct could support a hostile environment
claim under Title VII. Id. at 371.
185. Id. at 370.
186. Id. at 371. The EEOC guidelines read in relevant part: "In determining whether
alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a
whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances
and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred." Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993); see also Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appli-
ance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that incidents of harassment must
be repeated and continuous; isolated acts will not merit relief); Andrews v. City of Phila-
delphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (suggesting that the factfinder examine each
alleged incident of harassment "'in the context of several other related incidents.' " (quot-
ing Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989))).
187. See supra note 176.
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While they do not guarantee frivolous claims will not be brought, they
ensure that nonmeritorious claims rarely will prevail.' 88
Several Supreme Court and court of appeals decisions have clarified
the standards. 189 Most courts have exercised great restraint in their inter-
pretations of hostile environment doctrine, requiring particularly severe
harassment to find a hostile environment existed.190 For instance, in
Saxton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,191 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a hostile environment
did not exist' 92 when, on one occasion, a male supervisor rubbed his hand
along the female plaintiff's upper thigh and kissed her for several
seconds.'93 She admonished him, but several weeks later he drove her to
a secluded area, attempted to grab her, and later attempted to put his
hand on her leg again.194 Thereafter, the supervisor behaved particularly
coldly towards the plaintiff, allegedly rendering her work environment
hostile.' 95 The Seventh Circuit declared this course of conduct nothing
more than unpleasant or offensive.' 96 Courts have applied many of the
188. See Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, supra note 180, at 405:6681. The
EEOC expressly states that Title VII hostile environment claims are not to be used " 'as a
vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.' " Id. (quoting
Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984)).
189. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986). The Supreme Court
explained that
not all workplace conduct that may be described as "harassment" affects a "term,
condition, or privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII. For sex-
ual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)); see also Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 527, 537
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a woman who was treated coldly by her supervisor after she
refused his advances was not working in a hostile environment).
190. See Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Saxton, 10 F.3d at 533; Dan-
iels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1991); King v. Board of Regents,
898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
191. 10 F.3d at 526.
192. Id. at 537 (holding that even though the defendant's behavior was inappropriate
and unprofessional it was not so "serious or pervasive that it created a hostile work envi-
ronment within the meaning of Title VII").
193. Id. at 528.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 529.
196. Id. at 534. The Saxton court relied on Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 913
F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1990), which noted that multiple incidents of sexual misconduct
during plaintiff's first two weeks of work did not support a hostile environment claim
where they ceased after plaintiff reprimanded the aggressor. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 534. The
Saxton court also examined King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 534-35 (7th Cir. 1990),
which noted that repeated verbal assaults and physical harassment that continued despite
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same standards to Title IX cases, even though these cases generally do
not concern workplace situations.
19 7
Nearly all of the reported hostile environment cases address individu-
ally directed harassment, rather than general, diffuse harassment that is
purely environmental.' 98 In these cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants' direct harassment created or contributed to a hostile environ-
ment.' 99 While indirect or general environmental harassment may have
increased the plaintiff's sense of degradation and indignity, it was not the
main component of each of the claims.
20 0
An exception to this line of cases is Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc.,2°1 currently on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit. Not only did the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida grant the
individual plaintiff relief,202 it also enjoined the display of "sexually sug-
gestive, sexually demeaning, or pornographic" materials anywhere in the
workplace.20 3 The scope of the injunction was thus much broader than
the scope of the directed harassment of the plaintiff. This case has re-
ceived much attention and occasioned much controversy.20 4 Neverthe-
plaintiff's [reprimands] were sufficient to support a hostile environment claim. Saxton, 10
F.3d at 534.
197. E.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1988)
(discussing EEOC guidelines under Title IX, which rely on the well-developed case law
and legislative history of Title VIt); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp.
1360, 1366-70 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (recognizing a claim for sexual harassment based on a hostile
educational environment), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); see Monica L. Sherer, Com-
ment, No Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harass-
ment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2155-58 (1993) (advocating the application of Title VII
hostile environment standard to Title IX sexual harassment cases).
198. E.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
that plaintiffs were personally harassed, and that "the posting of pornographic pictures in
common areas and in the plaintiffs' personal work spaces" may serve as evidence of a
hostile environment); see also Brown v. Eastern Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861
(5th Cir. 1993) (admitting evidence of supervisor's nontargeted use of racial epithet, in
addition to harassment directed at plaintiff, as direct evidence of motivation); Yudovich v.
Stone, 839 F. Supp. 382, 389 (E.D. Va. 1993) (admitting evidence of supervisor's anti-Semi-
tism in finding a discriminatory work environment, even though some remarks were
nondirected).
199. Brown, 989 F.2d at 861; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485; Yudovich, 839 F. Supp. at 389.
200. Brown, 989 F.2d at 863; Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1484-85; Yudovich, 839 F. Supp. at
389.
201. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
202. Id. at 1541.
203. Id. at 1542 (requiring the defendant to adopt a sexual harassment policy with a
provision enjoining the display of such materials).
204. E.g., Chamallas, supra note 21, at 109-17; Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Wo-
man in Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 622-
25 (1993); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography,
79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1122-23 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 75, at 838. The American Civil
Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, argued that the prohibition of display of pornography is
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less, although the district court issued its decision in March of 1991,205 the
Eleventh Circuit has yet to rule.
Very few cases have followed the lead of Jacksonville Shipyards in reg-
ulating nondirected pornography or other nondirected expression in the
workplace.20 6 The reported cases on the whole therefore indicate that
unless a plaintiff is subjected individually to harassing conduct, it is un-
likely that a court will hold that a hostile environment existed. 20 7
If academic disciplinary committees or administrators applied the stan-
dards courts have developed in this area, it is doubtful that many exagger-
ated prosecutions would occur. Some recent problems, however, have
developed because universities have released the concept from its origi-
nal moorings. For example, at least one university found that classroom
discussion of a concept related to sex may suffice to create a hostile envi-
ronment.2 °8 Consequently, a pattern of objectionable behavior towards
an individual is no longer required.
One way to reduce this occurrence is to institute a pattern of behavior
requirement, inversely correlating frequency and severity, so that more
frequent harassment need not be as severe as less frequent.20 9 Addition-
ally, a policy should specify that harassment must be directed to an indi-
unconstitutionally overbroad and violative of the First Amendment. Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc. and ACLU, Inc. at 19-23 (Mar. 26, 1992) (No. 91-
3655).
205. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1486.
206. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 882-83 (D. Minn. 1994)
(holding that nontargeted conduct, such as sexual graffiti and pornographic photos, created
a sexualized work environment detrimental to women). The Jensen court granted an in-
junction requiring elimination of the sexualized work environment and ordered the em-
ployer to develop a program educating employees on permissible and impermissible
conduct. Id. at 888-89; see also Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenter's Union, 62 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 1 42,602, at 77,258 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding pornographic calendars posted in
work shanties or trailers on job sites created hostile environment for female plaintiff absent
any directed harassment).
207. See supra note 197.
208. For example, the Chicago Theological Seminary recently placed Professor Gray-
son Snyder on probation for discussing in class an anecdote from the Talmud. Dirk John-
son, A Sexual Harassment Case to Test Academic Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1994, at
D23; Edward Walsh, Sexual Ethics in the Seminary, WASH. POST, May 13, 1994, at Dl. The
anecdote concerns a man who falls off a roof onto a woman, accidentally having sexual
intercourse with her. Johnson, supra, at D23. Although Snyder intended to use the story
to illustrate the varying ethical approaches of Judaism and Christianity, the subject of the
class discussion, a task force found that the professor created a hostile environment when
he employed this example and offended a student. Walsh, supra, at D1.
209. See Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
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vidual.210 Then, one discussing or referring to sexuality in general would
not be chilled from expressing his or her beliefs.21'
Conversely, hostile environment claims should not be abolished en-
tirely in a misguided effort to avoid overbroad and misdirected charges.
Such action would eliminate many viable claims that ought to be re-
dressed.212 Although the hostile environment notion forms the back-
ground rather than the foreground of these claims, it remains useful for
their determination.
For example, imagine a male professor who repeatedly makes both di-
rect and indirect sexual advances toward numerous female students. His
behavior is primarily verbal.213 These advances are unwanted. The pro-
fessor frequents student hangouts and approaches students there, as well
as at school. 214 The net, overall effect of his conduct is to sexualize the
educational atmosphere both inside and outside his classroom. The uni-
versity administration appears completely indifferent to this faculty mem-
ber's conduct because it continues for an entire academic year unabated
and apparently unnoticed.
Absent the context of the sexualized academic environment, a student
to whom this man made advances or whom he propositioned once proba-
bly would not have a hostile environment claim because the conduct is
not sufficiently serious in itself. But, in this particular context, the ad-
vances become ominous and far more intimidating than they otherwise
might have been. A student in this position should be able to seek sanc-
tions against the professor because the oppressive environment would be
a significant factor in her personal harm.21 5 She could employ the ad-
210. See Johnson, supra note 208, at D23.
211. Id.
212. Imposing a targeted harassment limitation does not eviscerate the hostile environ-
ment notion, as the multitude of Title VII (and increasingly, Title IX) hostile environment
cases involving targeted harassment attest.
213. If his behavior is primarily physical, including unwanted touching and standing too
close, a sexual harassment complaint would not implicate academic freedom to the same
extent. Therefore, it would not be as problematic, even though expressive activity can
include physical behaviors.
214. I assume here that extramural behavior in some instances is actionable, such as
when the complainant is a member of the community and the behavior affects her situation
at school. In this hypothetical, the professor deliberately and repeatedly chooses to be
present where female students congregate. He then makes unwanted sexual advances.
This choice can evidence an intent to harass, and the behavior should be subject to a sexual
harassment policy.
215. Leaving her with the option of filing a Title IX claim would not always solve the
problem because of the time and expense involved in litigation. Indeed, the claim would
be rendered moot with respect to injunctive relief when the student graduated. See Alex-
ander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding in part that graduation
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vances made toward other students as evidence in a hearing to prove the
charge of sexual harassment of her.216
In contrast, a student to whom the professor made no direct advances
would have no standing to bring a complaint, even though she was af-
fected by the sexualized atmosphere at the school.217 No evidence would
exist, even circumstantially, of an intent to harass that would render the
situation the operative equivalent of a directed incident. Even if the pro-
fessor used sexual innuendo in the classroom, his behavior would not be
actionable unless she could demonstrate the conduct was tantamount to
targeted harassment.
Thus, while the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable be-
havior may seem arbitrary at the margins, it is justified. The practical
problems implicated in drafting a policy forbidding most nondirected har-
assment are insurmountable. Any such policy necessarily will sweep into
its ambit an unacceptable amount of expression that needs protection,
not condemnation.
VI. AAUP SUGGESTED REVISED POLICY
In a 1990 report (Report), the AAUP adopted a model policy for regu-
lating sexual harassment complaints (1990 Model Policy).218 Contrasting
the 1990 Model Policy with recently proposed revisions provides a con-
crete example of the standards I have proposed. The Report, Sexual Har-
assment: Suggested Policies and Procedures for Handling Complaints, is a
revision of a report adopted in 1984. The 1990 Model Policy adapts the
EEOC guidelines in large part and reads as follows:
It is the policy of this institution that no member of the aca-
demic community may sexually harass another. Sexual ad-
mooted former students' sexual harassment claims because they would not suffer from the
alleged injury nor benefit from the requested relief).
216. This evidence would involve individually directed harassment, even though the
professor did not address all of the harassment to this particular student. To prevent the
admission of evidence that is insufficient to sustain a charge of harassment, evidence of
nondirected harassment, at times, should be excluded from the hearing. Although the evi-
dence arguably could be relevant to motive or to both the victim's and perpetrator's states
of mind, it should be excluded when the prejudice it creates outweighs its probative value.
Cf. New Jersey v. Mortimer, 641 A.2d 257, 267 (N.J. 1994) (in criminal harassment cases,
courts should carefully scrutinize and weigh the prejudicial harm versus probative value of
evidence of "a defendant's bigoted thoughts, expressions, and associations"); FED. R.
EvID. 403.
217. Cf. Alexander, 631 F.2d at 184 (denying standing to plaintiffs whose sexual harass-
ment claims were too speculative to justify judicial action).
218. Sexual Harassment: Suggested Policy and Procedures for Handling Complaints,
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS, supra note 49, at 113.
1994]
Catholic University Law Review
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual
nature constitute sexual harassment when:
1. Any such proposals are made under circumstances implying
that one's response might affect such academic or personnel de-
cisions as are subject to the influence of the person making such
proposals; or
2. Such conduct is repeated or is so offensive that it substan-
tially contributes to an unprofessional academic or work envi-
ronment or interferes with required tasks, career opportunities,
or learning; or
3. Such conduct is abusive of others and creates or implies a
discriminatory hostility toward their personal or professional in-
terests because of their sex.
219
Paragraph one concerns quid pro quo harassment. Paragraph two in-
corporates the hostile environment concept, denominating it "an unpro-
fessional academic or work environment." Its explicit requirement that
the conduct be repeated or that it "substantially" affect the environment
constricts the EEOC standard. Paragraph three is not patterned after the
EEOC guidelines, but its threshold requirement is "abusive" conduct.
The Report also outlines complaint-resolving procedures that attempt
to protect the due process and privacy rights of parties to the dispute.22"
For instance, the procedures urge confidentiality to the extent possible.
Additionally, the procedures suggest that if informal measures are insuffi-
cient to resolve complaints, complainants "should have access to the
grievance procedures at the institution.",221 The faculty review commit-
tee, a peer group, which has authority to dismiss nonmeritorious com-
plaints, handles complaints against faculty members.222 If followed, these
procedures greatly would improve the adjudication of complaints at nu-
merous universities.
In 1992, the AAUP's Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure
(Committee A) issued a report that was critical of campus speech
codes.223 Committee A soon realized that this position was at odds with
the broad sexual harassment policy and subsequently reexamined the is-
sue of sexual harassment regulation. The Committee has issued a report
(Committee A Report) 2 24 that proposes a revised sexual harassment pol-
icy (Revised Policy). Arguing that ordinary workplace norms do not and
219. Id. at 114 pt. I.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 115 pt. II.
222. Id.
223. See supra note 57.
224. Academic Freedom and Sexual Harassment, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 64.
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cannot adequately protect academic freedom and the discourse that sus-
tains it,225 Committee A endorses the following Revised Policy:
It is the policy of this institution that no member of the aca-
demic community may sexually harass another. Sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual
nature constitute sexual harassment when:
1. Such proposals are made under circumstances implying that
one's response might affect academic or personnel decisions
that are subject to the influence of the person making the
proposal; or
2. Such speech or conduct is directed against another, and is
either abusive or severely humiliating, or persists despite the
objection of the person targeted by the speech or conduct.
In some cases the speaker's or actor's intention, taken
with the effects of the speech or action, may make clear that
there was a target of harassment, though the person or per-
sons were not explicitly identified. In such cases the forego-
ing policy applies.226
In comparison to the AAUP's 1990 Model Policy,227 the newly Revised
Policy retains paragraph one regarding quid pro quo harassment, substan-
tially revises paragraph two, and deletes paragraph three of the 1990
Model Policy concerning "discriminatory hostility." Paragraph three of
the 1990 Model Policy created a rather vague standard that is difficult to
constrain with reference to precedent, and it conceivably covered
nontargeted conduct such as classroom discussion of sexuality. There-
fore, I have no objection to its deletion. The revisions to paragraph two
are the most controversial aspect of the proposed policy because they
eliminate the hostile environment concept and add a targeting
requirement.
The sentences following paragraph two explain that an obvious target
is not always necessary. Essentially paralleling the functional equivalency
exception for nontargeted conduct that was discussed previously, Com-
mittee A is alluding to incidents such as the example concerning a woman
student who is unprepared for class.228 Indicating dissatisfaction, the
male professor turns to the class and comments that the school's affirma-
tive action program for women was a mistake. Circumstances indicate
that the woman student is actually the target of the professor's disparag-
ing statement. My proposed formulation and that of Committee A on
225. See id. at 64-67.
226. Id. at 67 pt. V.
227. See supra text accompanying note 219 (setting for the AAUP's 1990 Model Policy).
228. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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this particular issue do not differ in any important respects. I attempt to
flesh out in a bit more detail, however, a test to determine when an osten-
sibly, nondirected attack actually targets an individual.229
I mainly disagree with the Revised Policy's excision of the hostile envi-
ronment concept. For all the reasons set forth in the immediately preced-
ing section,230 I believe it is a mistake to abandon the notion.231 It is
possible to require targeting while importing the courts' construction of
the term into the academic disciplinary context. Such a limitation can
provide adequate notice of what conduct is forbidden without trampling
on academic freedom. Removal of the hostile environment notion cre-
ates a perception of sexual harassment as strictly an individualized, one-
on-one phenomenon, deleting consideration of its pervasive aspects. It
also removes the rhetorical and symbolic power of the environment no-
tion, rendering a more limited picture of the nature and scope of sexual
harassment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have addressed the conflict between academic free-
dom and prohibition of harassment from a communitarian perspective.
The structure and progression of the Article mirror my own process of
sifting and sorting through the very difficult and often emotional issues
involved. Although my proposed synthesis of the conflict provides no
ultimate answers and only provisional guidance to those confronting and
grappling with this dilemma, I do not believe that practical justice can
attain much more than that in most contexts. Any satisfactory resolution
at a particular institution ultimately and inevitably depends on the pres-
ence of policy makers, administrators, decision makers, and faculty per-
sons of good will, toleration, and a sincere desire to empathize 232 with the
struggles of others in the search for a better approach.
229. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
230. See supra part V.
231. As a consultant to Committee A on this issue, I argued that the concept should be
retained, but members of the subcommittee drafting the report and policy, as well as mem-
bers of the larger committee, were disturbed by some of the recent cases giving the term
almost unlimited application and voted to eliminate the hostile environment notion. See
supra notes 4, 129.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussing related factors that decision
makers should consider); see also Anne C. Dailey, Feminism's Return to Liberalism, 102
YALE L.J. 1265, 1278-79 (1993) (reviewing FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW
AND GENDER (1991) and endorsing an "empathetic liberalism"); Cynthia V. Ward, A
Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Litera-
ture, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (1994) (responding to Dailey).
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